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I. Introduction
Black Americans are suffering from the effects of slavery, Jim
Crow, and other forms of discrimination that continue to the
present day.1 This negative treatment has impacted, inter alia,

1. See generally, Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Why Reparations to African American
Descendants in the United States Are Essential to Democracy, 14 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 633, 635 (2011); Michael F. Bivens, Restorative Justice, Slavery, and the
American Soul, A Policy-Oriented Intercultural Human Rights Approach to the
Question of Reparations, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 254–55 (2006); Kyle D.
Logue, Reparations as Redistribution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1319, 1323 (2004); Carleton
Waterhouse, Total Recall:
Restoring the Public Memory of Enslaves
African-Americans and the American System of Slavery through Rectificatory
Justice and Reparations, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 703, 723 (2011); Eric Y.
Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African
American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 502 (1998).
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their financial status,2 their health,3 housing,4 and their
educational attainment.5 To remedy this harm, scholars, activists,
and politicians have called for reparations.6 William Darrity and
Kristen Mullen define reparations as “a program of
acknowledgment, redress, and closure of a grievance injustice,”
which in the case of Blacks “include[s] slavery, legal segregation
(Jim Crow), and ongoing discrimination and stigmatization.”7
Acknowledgment refers to “a formal apology and a
commitment for redress on the part of the American people as a
whole.”8 Redress—which can be in the form of restitution—refers
to the “restoration of survivors to their condition before the
injustice occurred or to a condition they might have attained had
the injustice not taken place.”9 Finally, “[c]losure involves mutual
conciliation between African Americans, the beneficiaries of
slavery, legal segregation, and ongoing discrimination toward
[B]lacks.”10
With respect to restitution, Darrity and Mullen elaborate:
“Specifically, restitution for African Americans would eliminate
racial disparities in wealth, income, education, health, sentencing
and incarceration, political participation, and subsequent
opportunities to engage in American political and social life.”11 As
this quote illustrates, addressing educational disparities is a key
component of a reparations program. A key cause of Black-white
2. See, e.g., Ronald Clifford, Note, The African American Family v. The
United States: A Template for the Lawsuit of Just Compensation, 5 WHITTIER J.
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 603, 619 (2006); A. Mechele Dickerson, Designing Slavery
Reparations: Lessons from Complex Litigation, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1278–79
(2020).
3. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 2, at 1271–74; Kevin Outterson, Tragedy
and Remedy: Reparations for Disparities in Black Health, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 735 (2005).
4. Jonathan Kaplan & Andrew Valls, Housing Discrimination as a Basis
for Black Reparations, 3 PUB. AFF. Q. 255 (2007).
5. ROY L. BROOKS, A NEW MODEL FOR REPARATIONS 36–97 (2004).
6. See supra notes 1–5 for citations.
7. WILLIAM A. DARRITY & KIRSTEN MULLEN, FROM HERE TO EQUALITY,
REPARATIONS FOR BLACK AMERICANS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 11 (2020).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 12.
10. Id.
11. Id. (emphasis added).

486

27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 483 (2021)

educational disparities is school funding.12 Black-white funding
disparities were a hallmark of the separate-but-equal era.13 These
disparities endured after Brown v. Board of Education and
continue into the present time.14 Consequently, schools in
predominantly Black communities are less able to provide an
education to meet the needs of their students.15
In this article, we explain why and how school finance reform
should be a part of a reparations program for Black Americans.
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I explains how Black-white
school funding disparities occurred during the separate-but-equal
era. Part II discusses how these funding disparities have occurred
in the aftermath of the Brown decision. Parts III and IV explore
why school desegregation and school finance litigation,
respectively, have failed to remedy these gaps. Part V lays out a
reparations framework that state legislatures could adopt to
provide restitution to schools and taxpayers harmed by state
policies creating Black-white racial funding disparities. Part VI
discusses the role that the federal government could play in a
school finance reparations program.
II. Part I: Separate-But-Equal Era
According to economist Robert Margo, during the
separate-but-equal era, “([B]lack-to-white) per pupil expenditures
in southern public schools followed a U-shaped pattern over time:
[A]n initial period of relative similarity in the late nineteenth
century, followed by a pronounced shift toward inequality around
12. Preston C. Green III, Bruce D. Baker, & Joseph Oluwole, Achieving
Racial Equal Educational Opportunity through School Finance Litigation, 4
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 283, 286 (2008) (stating that research studies show a
correlation between funding and educational outcomes for minority students).
13. See ROBERT A. MARGO, RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE SOUTH, 1880–1950:
AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 6–33 (1990) (describing how funding disparities contribute
to low socioeconomic status for American Blacks).
14. See Nonwhite School Districts Get $23 Billion Less Than White Districts
Despite Serving the Same Number of Students, EDBUILD (Feb. 2019),
https://edbuild.org/content/23-billion (explaining that gerrymandering school
district boundaries divides communities racially and economically)
[perma.cc/2CU4-38CV].
15. See Green et al., supra note 12, 308–11 (stating the correlation between
lack of funding and poor educational outcomes).
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the turn of the century that persisted for forty years, and then a
trend
toward
equalization
in
the
1940s.”16
Black
disenfranchisement and white demand for better schools caused
this initial decline in relative funding equality.17 Black
disenfranchisement enabled Southern middle-class and wealthy
whites to accept local property taxation because they did not have
to fund Black schools.18 Using a different scheme, poor whites, who
lived in counties with large Black populations relied on state aid
rather than local property taxes to finance better schools.19
Counties would divert a disproportionate amount of funding of
state aid, which was distributed based on total school aid
population, to white schools.20
Margo cited a 1917 U.S. Bureau of Education report titled
“Negro Education: A Study of the Private and High Schools for
Colored People in the United States” to illustrate the huge funding
and resource discrepancies between Black and white schools.21
According to the report, “[f]or every dollar spent on teacher salaries
per white child ages 6 to 14, 29 cents was spent per [B]lack child.”22
Because of this discrepancy in teacher salaries, Black schools
experienced “a shorter school year, [and] classroom overcrowding
(a higher teacher-pupil ratio).”23 This report also documented
shocking discrepancies in facilities and instructional materials:
Many of the [B]lack schools were in privately owned buildings
(churches, lodges, or rural cabins) donated to local school boards
16. MARGO, supra note 13, at 33.
17. See id. at 36. (“Growing demand and the concomitant institutional
changes, which were coincident with disenfranchisement, led to increases in
school budgets, frequently through the levying of local school property taxes.”).
18. See id. (“Wealthy white landlords argued against local school taxes
because they themselves bore, or so they believed, most of the cost and personally
received few benefits.”).
19. See id. (“[M]any middle-class white parents . . . were opposed to higher
school taxes because they, as a group, owned much more taxable wealth than
blacks[.]”).
20. See id. at 37 (“State school funds were typically allocated to counties on
the basis of the total school age population (or enrollment or attendance) in the
county; the funds were distributed to district school boards which had
considerable discretion in how to spend the money.”).
21. Id. at 18.
22. Id. at 19.
23. Id.
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and pressed into service. The exterior surroundings “varied
from untidy to positively filthy. Ash heaps often adorned the
front yards, . . . at barely respectable distances leaned ugly
outboxes in unscreened and shameful impudence. . . . School
equipment (books, blackboards, chalk, maps globes) was
undersupplied or nonexistent.24

Black-white school funding discrepancies were most extreme at
the high school level.25 There were only sixty-four public high
schools for Black children throughout the South.26 Indeed, “[a]
southern [B]lack child wishing a post-secondary education had to
seek it in one of the region’s private high schools or else leave the
region.”27 “Because most of the private schools were located in
towns or cities while the [B]lack population was heavily rural,” the
report further observed, “a [B]lack child’s opportunities for
secondary education were severely circumscribed.”28
Plessy v. Ferguson29 provided the legal support for these
inequitably funded, racially segregated schools during the
separate-but-equal era.30 In Plessy, the Court ruled that a
Louisiana statute that required railroads transporting passengers
to provide separate-but-equal accommodations for Blacks and
whites did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.31 The Court
reasoned that laws mandating racial separation were “within the
competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police
power.”32 The Court based its holding on the well-established
practice of maintaining racially segregated schools, noting that
“the most common instance” of the acceptable exercise of police
power “is connected with the establishment of separate schools for
24. Id. at 19–20.
25. Id. at 20 (noting that differences in education between white and Black
children were most pronounced at the high school level, where black children were
severely limited by the low number of available public schools and typically had
to seek out private schools).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (upholding the
constitutionality of racial segregation).
30. See id. (approvingly citing racially segregated schools).
31. See id. at 550–51 (finding the segregation of races does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment).
32. Id.

SCHOOL FINANCE, RACE, AND REPARATIONS

489

white and colored children.”33 The Court also could not find the
Louisiana statute “unreasonable or more obnoxious to the
fourteenth amendment than the acts of congress requiring
separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia.”34
In an 1899 decision, Cumming v. Board of Education of
Richmond County, Georgia,35 the Court signaled that the mere
existence of Black schools “was sometimes precarious.”36 In this
case, a school board closed the high school for Black students while
maintaining a high school for white students.37 The board allegedly
made this decision because it had insufficient funds to maintain a
Black high school in light of the demand for a primary school for
Black children.38 The Court refused to enjoin the board from
maintaining the white high school, finding that the closing of the
Black high school was a permissible exercise of state discretion:
[W]hile all admit that the benefits and burdens of public
taxation
must
be
shared
by
citizens
without
discrimination . . . on account of their race, the education of the
people in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter
belonging to the respective states, and any interference on the
part of Federal authority with the management of such schools
cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and
unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of
the land.39

It was not until the 1940s when the gap narrowed between
Black and white schools with respect to length of school term, class
size, and per-pupil expenditures.40 This narrowing was due to legal
challenges from the NAACP, monitoring of Black schools by the
federal government, studies of school conditions by Black scholars,
33. Id.
34. Id. at 551.
35. See Cumming v. Bd. of Educ. of Richmond Cnty., Georgia 175 U.S. 528,
545 (1899) (holding that the discontinuation of high school services for Black
children was constitutional).
36. MARGO, supra note 13, at 70.
37. See Cumming, 175 U.S. at 544 (laying out the facts of the school board’s
decision).
38. See id. at 544–45 (explaining the school board’s decision on financial
grounds).
39. Id. at 545.
40. See MARGO, supra note 13, at 26 (describing the relationship between
school, race, and labor outcomes).
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and changing public opinion.41 Because of this pressure, the South
responded “by paying closer attention to the equal part of
separate-but-equal, fearing the loss of the separate part.”42
However, it was too late because the NAACP had shifted its
strategy to target the morality of the separate-but-doctrine.43 This
change in approach would lead to the Supreme Court’s ruling in
the 1954 Brown decision, which overturned Plessy.44
III. Part II: Black-White School Funding Disparities in the
Aftermath of Brown
In spite of decades of school and school finance litigation in the
aftermath of Brown, racial funding disparities still remain to the
present day.45 A report by the nonprofit group EdBuild found that
school districts serving predominantly nonwhite students received
$23 billion less than white districts during the 2015–16 school
year.46 According to the report, the average nonwhite district
received $2,226 less than a white school district per student.47
Racial disparities remain even after controlling for wealth:
Poor-white school districts still received almost $1,500 more per
student than their poor-nonwhite counterparts.48 In this part, we
discuss how these racial funding gaps have persevered, focusing on
Black-white differences.

41. See id. at 50–51 (“The initial court battles, focusing on desegregation of
higher education and the elimination of separate wage scales for black and white
teachers, were fought in the late 1930s and early 1940s[.]”).
42. Id. at 51.
43. See id. (discussing the NAACP’s strategy shift towards an argument that
“de jure segregation was morally wrong”).
44. See id. (stating that the NAACP’s new focus on the morality of de jure
segregation found success in Brown v. Board of Education).
45. See EDBUILD, supra note 14 (describing funding and racially disparities).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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A. Property Taxes
The most obvious source of race-based, particularly
Black-white disparities in school funding are those that result from
differences in the taxable property wealth of taxing districts which
provide revenue for schools serving Black versus those serving
white students.49 Local public-school districts in many states
continue to rely heavily on local property taxes to support their
schools.50 Particularly through the first half of the twentieth
century, numerous actors including government programs and
officials as well as private developers engaged in highly
orchestrated efforts to create and reinforce racially segregated
housing development.51 Many of these forces persist to this day,
through practices ranging from discriminatory mortgage lending
practices to exclusionary zoning.52 The creation of the Federal
Housing Authority in 1934, increasing the share of a home’s value
that could be taken on as a mortgage, and the term over which a
mortgage could be paid significantly increased access to single
family housing for young buyers.53 But, due to both explicit and
implicit criteria for accessing these loans, the beneficiaries were
overwhelmingly white.54 These included risk criteria developed by
the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) for issuing insured
loans that invariably classified homes in non-immigrant white
neighborhoods as the lowest risk and homes in Black

49. See BRUCE J. BIDDLE & DAVID C. BERLINER, EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP:
BEYOND INSTRUCTIONAL LEADERSHIP 48–59 (2002) (stating that public school
funding originates from property taxes).
50. See id. (“Nearly half of the funding for public schools in the United
States, however, is provided through local taxes, generating large differences in
funding between wealthy and impoverished communities[.]”).
51. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
52. See Kaplan & Valls, supra note 4, at 255 (“An important part of the story
of racial inequality today is the history of housing and lending discrimination in
the second half of the twentieth century.”).
53. See id at 261 (“[A]lmost all of the growth in home-ownership between
1920 (46 percent) and 1960 (62 percent) came from under-60 buyers.”).
54. See id. (“[B]oth explicit and implicit racial preferences built into the FHA
loan system meant that the beneficiaries of FHA-insured loans were
overwhelmingly White, and Black Americans had little opportunity to purchase
homes on an equal footing with White Americans.”).
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neighborhoods as high risk and often ineligible for insured loans.55
The expansion of access to homeownership, through both FHA and
Veterans Administration (VA) backed loans became a primary
path to building family wealth in the post WWII period, but due to
restrictions in access to these loans, Blacks were largely excluded
from this opportunity.56
In many cases, zones were relegated to Black homeownership
based on established school boundaries, while in others, school
district boundaries were redrawn (and redrawn) around Black or
white neighborhoods to reinforce segregation.57 Special legislation
was passed in Missouri in 2006 permitting the remaining
predominantly white northeastern corner of Kansas City, Missouri
to unilaterally annex itself from the Black city district to its mostly
white neighbor.58 The organization of school district taxing
jurisdictions across states remains a complicated patchwork,
wherein race and racial segregation continue to play a significant
role.59 Most intensely segregated across taxing jurisdictions are
Northeastern and Great Lakes area metropolitan areas where
each highly segregated suburban enclave tends to act as its own
school taxing jurisdiction.60 In New England states, the town or
municipality serves as the fiscal steward of the school district,
more closely aligning governance of zoning policy with governance
of schools.61 Southern states operate mostly county-based systems,
where counties in the aggregate tend to be more racially diverse
55. See id. at 262 (discussing the impact of a low insurance rating on the
ability to receive an insured loan).
56. See id. (noting that the loans available to military veterans “largely
excluded homes in urban areas, and favored new homes in the suburbs” which
tended not to benefit African Americans).
57. See Kevin Gotham, Missed Opportunities, Enduring Legacies: School
Segregation and Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, AM. STUD. 5–10 (2002)
(stating that gerrymandering contributes to racial segregation).
58. See Elle Moxley, The Data Shows Kansas City’s School System Is
Complicated, Segregated and Inefficient, KCUR (May 9, 2019),
https://www.kcur.org/education/2019-05-09/the-data-shows-kansas-citys-schoolsystem-is-complicated-segregated-and-inefficient (“By 2017, 78 percent of schools
in the system were segregated–25 district schools and 30 charter schools.”)
[perma.cc/UK2E-8F88].
59. See id. (quoting various national experts on the similarity of problems
facing the district to nationwide issue).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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than the cities and towns within them.62 While this organizational
feature should theoretically mitigate racial disparities, on the one
hand, it allows the disparities to simply be hidden within counties,
and on the other hand, southern states created separate
independent, segregated city districts carved from their county
hosts.
It is important to understand, however, that tax bases from
which local revenue for schools is derived do not exist exclusively
of residential property, nor is most of the variation in wealth from
one to another taxing jurisdiction driven by variation in residential
property values.63 A significant share of local property tax bases
includes commercial, industrial, utility and other non-residential
properties.64 Sometimes, high value properties are otherwise
undesirable to have in your back yard—such as an oil refinery or
other industrial facility—and thus we find these properties in the
back yards of low value residential properties relegated for
minority homeownership.65 The presence and uneven distribution
of these taxable assets often complicates analysis of the
intersection between race, taxable wealth and school revenues.66
This specific problem undermined establishing residents of school
districts with weak tax bases as a suspect classification in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,67 where
evidence was provided that significant shares of low-income
families resided in districts with relatively high taxable property
wealth.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the poorest families are
62. See Kendra Taylor, Erica Frankenberg, & Genevieve Siegal-Hawley,
Racial Segregation in the Southern Schools, School Districts, and Counties Where
Districts Have Seceded, AERA OPEN, Sept. 3, 2019, at 1–10 (“Despite
long-standing White resistance to desegregation, judicial pressure meant that the
South’s countywide school systems (or ones that include both cities and suburbs)
historically have been some of the most integrated for Black and White
students.”).
63. DAVID H. MONK & BRIAN O. BRENT, RAISING MONEY FOR EDUCATION: A
GUIDE TO PROPERTY TAX (1997).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23 (1973)
(holding that financing schools using local property taxes was not
unconstitutional).
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not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. A
recent and exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut
concluded that “[i]t is clearly incorrect . . . to contend that the
‘poor’ live in ‘poor’ districts. . . . Thus, the major factual
assumption of Serrano—that the educational financing system
discriminates against the ‘poor’—is simply false in
Connecticut.” Defining “poor” families as those below the
Bureau of the Census “poverty level,” the Connecticut study
found, not surprisingly, that the poor were clustered around
commercial and industrial areas—those same areas that
provide the most attractive sources of property tax income for
school districts. Whether a similar pattern would be discovered
in Texas is not known, but there is no basis on the record in this
case for assuming that the poorest people—defined by reference
to any level of absolute impecunity—are concentrated in the
poorest districts.68

Finally, states impose various degrees of regulation over property
taxes, including but not limited to regulating rates at which
property taxes can be increased or regulating the amount of or
growth in revenues that can be generated by local property taxes.69
Some of these measures mitigate racial disparities in taxation and
revenues generated while others exacerbate these disparities.70
Importantly, every aspect of these systems of local property
taxation for public schools is a function of state policy and
governance—state policies defining taxing jurisdictions, methods
of assessing taxable value, procedures for setting tax rates and
collecting revenues.
B. Insufficient General State Aid
The second source of inequality in state school funding
systems is essentially the state’s failure to fully address the first.
Every state has some general state aid formula, for which the
68. Id. at 23.
69. See id. at 15 (“Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail in San
Antonio and in varying degrees throughout the State.”).
70. See id. at 58 (“[S]everal research projects have concluded that any
financing alternative designed to achieve a greater equality of expenditures is
likely to lead to higher taxation and lower educational expenditures in the major
urban centers, a result that would exacerbate rather than ameliorate existing
conditions in those areas.”).
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primary objective is usually to allocate state aid—derived from
state sales and income taxes—to offset differences in the ability of
local taxing jurisdictions to raise revenue for their schools.71 These
general formula aid programs, or “equalization aid” programs have
existed since the 1920s.72 When funded adequately, achieving their
most basic function, these aid programs would permit every local
jurisdiction in a state to raise a specific target amount of revenue—
a foundation level—at equitable taxation, considering either or
both taxable property wealth and income (ability to pay) of
residents.73 States largely still fall short of this goal, though on
average, across the country, districts serving higher
concentrations of children from families in poverty do spend
roughly the same as districts serving lower concentrations of
children from families in poverty.74 There remains significant
variation across and within states, with respect to poverty and
with respect to race.75
C. Stealth Inequalities
Modern state aid formulas should generally go beyond wealth
equalization and should also accommodate the differences in
student needs and other costs associated with providing each child
in the state with equal opportunity to achieve a common set of
outcome goals.76 Doing so introduces complexities into state school
71. See generally Bruce D. Baker, Ajay Srikanth, Robert Cotto Jr., & Preston
C. Green III, School Funding Disparities and the Plight of Latinx Children, 28
EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS 135 (2020) (explaining the need for race-conscious school
funding policies).
72. See id. at 3 (“In theory, state school finance systems are designed to a)
remediate disparities between local public-school districts that arise from
differences in wealth and revenue raising capacity of those districts and b) provide
supplemental resources to districts serving needier student populations or facing
other cost pressures.”).
73. See id. at 18 (showing data suggesting equalization with equalized
spending).
74. See id. (offering conclusions on the data showing inequality in Latinx
populations).
75. See id. (tabling data which demonstrates the various disparities).
76. See PETER D. VEILLETTE, UNDERSTANDING STATE SCHOOL FINANCE
FORMULAS 4 (1987) (explaining how race-conscious policies reduces the racial
achievement gap).
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finance formulas either in the form of adjustments to the general
aid formula or addition of supplemental formulas or categorical
grants.77 Political acceptance of the concept of adjustments to
advance equal educational opportunity, however, has led some
states to craft and adopt adjustments to their school finance
formulas that do the opposite, including adjustments which
exacerbate wealth and income related disparities or reinforce past
racial disparities.78 Bruce Baker and Sean Corcoran referred to
these as “stealth inequalities”—features of state aid formulas
wherein the state itself had designed a system of allocating aid to
make disparities worse, not better.79 We provide examples of
stealth inequalities exacerbating race-based disparities later in
this article.
IV. Part III: School Desegregation Litigation
School desegregation and school finance litigation arose from
the similar objective “of equalizing educational opportunities for
poor and/or minority students.”80 School desegregation litigation
sought to achieve this goal through integration while school
finance litigation targeted the distribution of educational
funding.81 In this Part, we focus on why school desegregation failed
to correct Black-white school funding disparities. Because of school
desegregation litigation’s focus on integration, one might conclude
that there were no challenges to inequitable school funding.82
However, there were instances where courts did address funding

77. See id. (discussing the operation of equalization formulas).
78. See Bruce D. Baker & Sean P. Corcoran, The Stealth Inequalities of
School Funding: How State and Local School Finance Systems Perpetuate
Inequitable Student Spending, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 2012),
http://www.statewideonline.org/111312/files/StealthInequities%20Rutgers.pdf.
[perma.cc/Q7H5-TEZY] (discussing the approaches of different states in using
different aid formulas).
79. See id. (describing “stealth inequalities” as “inequities not solely due to
differences in available resources.”).
80. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 258 (1999).
81. See id. at 259 (“[S]chool desegregation cases sought equality indirectly
through integration.”).
82. Id.

SCHOOL FINANCE, RACE, AND REPARATIONS

497

disparities in school desegregation litigation.83 This part discusses
these cases and explains why they were unsuccessful in remedying
Black-white school funding disparities.
A. Hobson v. Hansen
In Hobson v. Hansen,84 a federal district court addressed
whether the District of Columbia complied with Bolling v.
Sharpe,85 a companion case to Brown.86 The court held that the
disparity in resources between Black and white elementary schools
was considerably unequal and was thus unconstitutional as well.87
The typical school building serving Black students was almost
sixty years old, which was twenty years below the median age of
other school buildings in the city.88 Black schools operated at 115%
of capacity, while white schools generally operated at 77%
capacity.89 Teachers in the Black schools had much less teaching
experience and were twice as likely to have only temporary
licenses.90 In contrast, white schools had a large number of
teachers with graduate degrees, a feature that was atypical of
predominantly Black schools.91 Median per-pupil expenditures for
Black schools were $100 fewer than those of white schools.92
Finally, students attending Black schools had much less access to
kindergarten than students attending white schools.93 However,
83. See infra Section IV.A
84. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269. F. Supp. 401, 405–06 (D.D.C. 1967) (holding
that the school board and superintendent of public schools in Washington, D.C.
unconstitutionally deprived Black children of their right to equal educational
opportunities).
85. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that segregation
in public schools was a violation of the Due Process clause of the Fifth
Amendment).
86. See Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 405–06 (stating that the Court used Hobson
to “test the current compliance of Washington D.C. public schools’ compliance
with the principles announced in Bolling and Brown v. Board of Education”).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 495.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 495–96.
92. Id.
93. See id. (explaining access to kindergarten for Black children was
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the court found that the disparities between Black and white
schools were not caused by intentional discrimination, but rather
by the indifference of school administrators.94
The court held that withholding equal educational
opportunities from Black students in the District of Columbia
denied them equal protection of the law.95 In reaching this
decision, the court fashioned a new separate-but-equal doctrine to
address inequalities caused by de facto segregation.96 As the court
explained, “it should be clear that if whites and Negroes, or rich
and poor, are to be consigned to separate schools pursuant to
whatever policy, the minimum the Constitution will require and
guarantee is that for their objectively measurable aspects these
schools should be run on the basis of real equality, at least unless
any inequalities are adequately justified.”97 The court supported
this assertion by explaining, “Whatever the law was once, it is a
testament to our maturing concept of equality that, with the help
of Supreme Court decisions in the last decade, we now firmly
recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as
disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as
the perversity of a willful scheme.”98
In the Rodriguez decision, however, the Supreme Court
dramatically weakened the efficacy of the Equal Protection Clause
for challenging racial funding disparities.99 The Rodriguez Court
dependent on classroom space).
94. See id. at 442 (“The causes of the inequalities are relatively objective and
impersonal. School officials can be faulted, but for another reason: that in the face
of these inequalities they have sometimes shown little concern.”).
95. Id. at 496. This case was decided under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which the Supreme Court held contains an equal protection
component.
96. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 496 (1967) (discussing how the
court considered “whether these documented inequalities in the predominantly
Negro schools den[ied] the children who [were] assigned by defendants to attend
them equal educational opportunity and equal protection of the law” in reaching
its conclusion).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 497.
99. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973)
(holding that Texas’s school funding plan, which created unequal wealth
distribution between school districts, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
because the proper standard is whether the challenged state action rationally
furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest. The court held that Texas’s scheme
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held that existing disparities in funding between school districts
that resulted from Texas’s reliance on local property taxation were
permissible.100 The Court rejected the claim that the school finance
system should be subject to strict scrutiny because the plaintiffs
were members of a suspect classification based upon wealth.101
The Court also rejected the notion that strict scrutiny was
applicable because education was a fundamental interest under
the Constitution.102
Instead of strict scrutiny, the Court found that the rational
basis test was the appropriate form of analysis.103 The Court then
concluded that the use of local property taxation was rationally
related to encouraging local control of the public schools.104 By
becoming involved in educational decisions at the local level,
community members demonstrated their depth of commitment to
public education.105 Local control also provided each locality with
the means for participating “in the decision-making process of
determining how local tax dollars will be spent.”106 Moreover, local
control enabled school districts “to tailor local plans for local needs”
and encouraged “experimentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence.”107
met this standard).
100. Id.
101. See id. at 19–29 (concluding that “the Texas system does not operate to
the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class . . . in recognition of the fact that
this Court has never . . . held that wealth discrimination alone provides an
adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny, appellees have not relied solely on this
contention”).
102. See id. at 29–39 (discussing fundamental rights generally and ultimately
noting that the Court had “carefully considered each of the arguments supportive
of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and
have found those arguments unpersuasive”).
103. See id. at 40 (“A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal
Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application of the traditional
standard of review, which requires only that the State's system be shown to bear
some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”).
104. See id. at 55 (“The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection
Clause is whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate
state purpose or interest.”).
105. See id. at 49 (“The persistence of attachment to government at the lowest
level where education is concerned reflects the depth of commitment of its
supporters.”).
106. Id. at 50.
107. Id. at 51.
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Although the Equal Protection Clause challenge in Rodriguez
was based on wealth disparities, it is important to observe that the
case served as an implicit rejection of the equality standard used
in Hobson.108 Indeed, Taunya Lovell Banks observes that “[r]ace,
in the broadest sense, was the elephant in the courtroom.”109 She
further points out that the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, who were
“characterized as poor and Mexican-American, seemed to be
arguing that state educational funding determinations based on
wealth not only impair a fundamental right, but also are suspect
under the Equal Protection Clause . . . when these decisions
disproportionately impact racialized groups.”110 The Supreme
Court removed all doubt about the validity of Hobson in
Washington v. Davis111 by holding that a statute or official practice
was not rendered unconstitutional by having an adverse disparate
impact on minority groups.112 As the Court explained:
[V]arious Courts of Appeals have held in several
contexts . . . that the substantially disproportionate racial
impact of a statute or official practice standing alone and
without regard to discriminatory purpose, suffices to prove
racial discrimination violating the Equal Protection
Clause . . . . [T]o the extent that those cases rested on or
expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose
is unnecessary in making out an equal protection violation, we
are in disagreement.113

B. Milliken v. Bradley
It was not until the Milliken v. Bradley114 litigation that the
Supreme Court sanctioned the imposition of educational
108. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 496 (1967) (holding that schools
objectively measurable aspects be run on the basis of real equality, at least unless
any inequalities are adequately justified).
109. Taunya Lovell Banks, Brown at 50: Reconstructing Brown’s Promise, 44
WASHBURN L.J. 39, 59 (2004).
110. Id.
111. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 252 (1976) (finding that a police
department’s use of employment test for hiring purposes did not violate Equal
Protection Clause).
112. Id. at 244–45.
113. Id.
114. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977) (holding
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programming—and additional spending to implement these
programs—as part of court-ordered desegregation plans.115 In
Milliken I,116 the Court invalidated a desegregation plan that
would have called for the integration of Detroit’s predominantly
Black school districts with the predominantly white suburban
school districts.117 The Court ruled in this manner because there
was no evidence of intentional discrimination on the part of the
latter districts.118 As a result of Milliken I, racial residential
segregation across established school district lines has remained a
primary cause of racial segregation in schooling in many parts of
the country.119
In Milliken II,120 the Court approved a Detroit-only plan that
included educational components such as remedial reading,
in-service teacher training, nondiscriminatory testing reforms,
testing, and counseling.121 The Court upheld the plan because the
federal judiciary “need not, and cannot, close their eyes to
inequalities, shown by the record, which flow from a longstanding

that prospective relief to bring about educational equality was not barred by the
Tenth or Eleventh Amendment).
115. See id. at 267–68 (affirming the District Court order implementing the
student assignment plan and associated educational components).
116. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (holding
that it was improper to impose a multi-district remedy for a single-district de jure
segregation action without evidence that the included districts acted in a way that
effected segregation).
117. See id. at 748–53 (concluding that “the relief ordered by the District
Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was based upon an erroneous
standard and was unsupported by record evidence that acts of the outlying
districts effected the discrimination found to exist in the schools of Detroit” and
remanding the case”).
118. See id. at 745 (“To approve the remedy ordered by the court would impose
on the outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional
violation, a wholly impermissible remedy based on a standard not hinted at in
Brown I and II or any holding of this Court.”).
119. Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of Integration Past,
Present, and Future, 47 HOW. L.J. 795, 811 (2004); Sheryll D. Cashin, American
Public Schools Fifty Years after Brown: A Separate But Equal Reality, 47 HOW.
L.J. 341, 347 (2004); Ryan, supra note 80, at 261.
120. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977).
121. See id. at 290–91 (affirming the affirming the District Court order
implementing the student assignment plan and associated educational
components).
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segregated system.”122 In the words of James Ryan, “If the schools
were going to be separate as a result of Milliken I, Milliken II
seemed to hold out the possibility that they might be equal.”123
Despite the Court’s apparent recognition that educational
spending was necessary to overcome the effects of segregation,
Gary Orfield and colleagues have labeled Milliken II remedies as
a “limited form of reparations” that has not been implemented
successfully.124 “A fundamental weakness” of Milliken II remedies
was “that the extra funding to segregated schools [was] not
guaranteed to last.”125 Indeed, “[t]he programs suffer from
impermanence because they often depend upon tenuous political
support and politicized local or state budget processes.”126
Therefore, “the programs can be easily removed by courts or school
districts even where there is no proof that the programs have done
what they were supposed to—improve conditions for minority
students.”127 That the programs’ survival depends upon a thin web
of political support and budgetary responsibilities is particularly
troubling because these schools serve communities that are
traditionally weak players in local politics.”128
Missouri v. Jenkins129 is perhaps the most striking example of
the failure of Milliken II desegregation plans to implement a
reparations plan for Black students.130 In this case, a district court
ruled that the Kansas City School District (KCMSD) and the state
of Missouri had committed de jure segregation.131 The judge then
attempted to improve the “desegregative attractiveness” of the
district’s schools by implementing a district-wide magnet school
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 283.
Ryan, supra note 80, at 261.
GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 12 (1997).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995) (holding that the district
court overstepped its remedial authority in creating a magnet school program).
130. See generally id.
131. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1505–06 (D. Mo. 1984) (noting
that the state had the “constitutional obligation to affirmatively dismantle any
system of de jure segregation” and that the state and school district “defaulted in
their obligation to uphold the Constitution”).
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program.132 The Supreme Court ruled that the magnet school
program exceeded the district court’s remedial authority.133
Critics of increased school finance spending have cited the
Jenkins case as evidence that there is no correlation between
increased educational funding and educational outcomes.134 Their
argument is based on three premises: (1) KCMSD received a great
deal more money than any other large school district in the country
over an extended period; (2) because the exorbitant spending did
not lead to improved student outcomes, the plan is a national
model for why spending large sums of money on predominantly
Black schools is non-productive and inefficient; and (3) the state of
Missouri covered a disproportionate share of the costs of the
desegregation plan which indirectly harmed the state’s other
school districts.135
Preston Green and Bruce Baker have challenged these claims
regarding the Jenkins case.136 Their empirical analysis of KCMSD
spending revealed that “peak funding lasted for a relative short
period of time.”137 Because KCMSD was a high-spending school
district for such a short time, it could not be considered the “poster
child” for the assertion that “money doesn’t matter” with respect to
student outcomes.138 Further, Green and Baker determined that
the KCMSD’s property taxpayers consistently paid a much higher
share of the district’s state and local operating revenue than other
districts across the state.139 Finally, Green and Baker found that
132. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 75.
133. See id. at 92–93 (differentiating the magnet school remedy in this case
from previous upheld cases).
134. See Preston C. Green III & Bruce D. Baker, Urban Legends,
Desegregation and School Finance: Did Kansas City Really Prove That Money
Doesn’t Matter?, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 58 (2006) (“A number of courts that
have invalidated their school finance systems did so after finding a correlation
between educational funding and academic outcomes. Conservative critics have
countered that Missouri v. Jenkins. . . proves that no such correlation exists.”).
135. Id. at 82–84 (summarizing arguments against increased education
funding).
136. See id. at 80 (“[A]nalysis of the Jenkins litigation reveals that Judge
Clark attempted to enforce remedies on KCMSD and the state of Missouri by
relying on the federal court precedents made by Milliken I and Milliken II.”).
137. Id. at 100.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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the redistribution of statewide additional state revenues to
KCMSD amounted to $78 per pupil—a relatively small sum.140
Green and Baker then ask how the premises of the Jenkins
critique could be so “distorted.” As they explain, this assessment:
[F]ails to take into account the history of KCMSD and the state
of Missouri. We have observed that the residential structure
and demographics of KCMSD were carefully crafted by city
officials and real estate developers into racially segregated
enclaves for the first 60 years of the 20th century. We have also
noted that in the 1960s, KCMSD was a relatively high spending
district, but because of the school funding system’s reliance on
property taxation and KCMSD’s racial and socio-economic
composition, the district would soon be unable to meet its
educational needs. Moreover, we explained that Judge Clark
responded to KCMSD’s financial concerns in the Jenkins
litigation by imposing an extremely high property tax rate on
the district.141

Thus, Green and Baker reason, it was easy to understand “that the
Jenkins litigation only temporarily shifted KCMSD’s relative
funding levels compared with either a national peer group of
metropolitan districts or a local labor market peer group.”142 This
analysis of Jenkins is consistent with Orfield’s critique of Milliken
II plans—they are a form of limited reparations that do not last
long enough to undo the harm caused by consistent underfunding.
V. Part IV: School Finance Litigation
As noted above, school finance litigation seeks to achieve equal
educational opportunities for minority and poor students by
targeting the distribution of educational funding.143 Legal scholars
have identified three waves of school funding challenges.144 In the
140. Id.
141. Id. at 100–01.
142. Id. at 101.
143. See Green et al., supra note 12, at 284 ("The goal of school finance
litigation is ‘to increase the amount and equalize the distribution of academic
opportunities and performance of students disadvantaged by existing finance
schemes.’”).
144. See generally, Carlee Poston Escue, William E. Thro, & R. Craig Wood,
Some Perspectives on Recent School Finance Litigation, 268 ED. LAW REP. 601,
601 (2011); David Hinojosa, “Race-Conscious” School Finance Litigation: Is a
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first wave, plaintiffs claimed that school funding disparities
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.145 The Supreme Court closed this door in its
Rodriguez decision discussed above.146 In the second wave,
litigants based their school finance challenges on state equal
protection clauses.147 They sought to distinguish their claims from
Rodriguez by arguing that education was a fundamental right,
thus triggering the strict scrutiny standard instead of the more
lenient rational basis analysis.148 Although plaintiffs had success
in the early stages of this wave, courts grew resistant to this legal
theory by the end of the second wave.149 During the third wave,
plaintiffs asserted that states have provided insufficient resources
either to achieve minimal educational outcomes or to prepare
students to “become positive contributors to the economic, social
and democratic fabric.”150 Plaintiffs have had more success in the
third wave, winning two-thirds of cases during this period.151
Although school finance litigation has generally steered clear
of race, there have been several instances where plaintiffs have
directly challenged school funding policies that have caused racial
disparities and demanded that states take race into account to

Fourth Wave Emerging?, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 869, 871 (2016); William S. Koski,
Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-examination of the
Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2003); Ann Williams Shavers, Rethinking the Equity
vs. Adequacy Debate: Implications for Rural School Finance Litigation, 82 NEB.
L. REV. 133, 137 (2003); William Thro, School Finance Litigation as Facial
Challenges, 272 ED. LAW REP. 687, 694 (2011).
145. See Hinojosa, supra note 144, at 872 (“[T]hese cases filed claims under
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
146. See id. (explaining how Rodriguez ended the first wave).
147. See id. (pointing to the development of suits based on state constitutional
claims).
148. See id. (identifying the strategic advantage of equal protection claims
with strict scrutiny).
149. See id. at 873 (pointing to courts growing reluctance to hear the state
equal protection claims).
150. Id.
151. See id. (“[F]avor of the plaintiffs with wins in two-thirds of cases over the
past twenty-two years.”).
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remedy them.152 The remainder of this part summarizes these
cases.
A. Alabama: Lynch v. Alabama
In Lynch v. Alabama,153 the plaintiffs alleged that the state’s
property tax system was “rooted in [the State’s] historic racially
discriminatory policies . . . and cripple the ability of certain rural,
nearly all-[B]lack public systems in Alabama to raise revenues” in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.154 One especially
problematic constitutional provision was Amendment 373, which
established a property classification system “for determining the
value of the property that is subject to a given tax rate.”155 This
amendment allowed Class III property, “which includes
agricultural, forest, and single residential property,” to be taxed at
ten percent of its value instead of fair market value.156 This
amendment severely limited the ability of rural “Black Belt” school
districts to obtain educational funding because “very little of the
property’s true fair market value [is] subject to taxation.”157
The plaintiffs attempted to establish discriminatory intent by
attempting to connect Amendment 373 to the state’s antipathy
against funding public education for Black students.158 This
hostility was evidenced, inter alia, in the 1901 Constitution, which
prevented Blacks from raising revenue for schools by
disfranchising them and placing restrictions on property

152. See id. at 870 (listing Martinez v. New Mexico and Silver v. Halifax
County School Board Association as two examples of such cases and discussing
each in context).
153. See Lynch v. Alabama, No. 08-S-450-NE, 2011 WL 13186739 (N.D. Ala.
Nov. 7, 2011), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom., I.L. v. Alabama,
739 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court’s rejection of the claim
that Alabama’s tax policies had a continuing segregative effect on its system of
higher education).
154. I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2014).
155. Id. at 1282.
156. Id.
157. Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted).
158. Id. at 1286–87 (discerning no error in the “district court’s finding that
Amendment 373 was not racially motivated”).
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taxation.159 A federal district court disagreed.160 While there was
overwhelming evidence that the state passed the 1901 constitution
with “virulent, racially-discriminatory intent,”161 the court
reasoned that Amendment 373 was “a reaction to the increases in
property appraisals and assessments mandated by [a prior court
decision], and the accompanying threat of a tremendous increase
in the property taxes paid by large landowners.”162
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling that racial discrimination was not a substantial or
motivating factor behind the enactment of Amendment 373,
finding that the lower court did not clearly err in choosing to credit
the evidence supporting this conclusion.163
B. Kansas: Montoy v. Kansas
In the Montoy v. Kansas litigation,164 school districts enrolling
large shares of Black and Latinx students alleged that the state’s
school finance formula violated equal protection and educational
provisions.165 A significant portion of the state’s school funding
woes can be traced to a series of funding and organizational
policies that worked in tandem to create unequal and inadequate

159. See Lynch v. Alabama, No. 08-S-450-NE, 2011 WL 13186739, at *256–
66. (N.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2011) aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom., I.L.
v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that the 1901 Constitution
was “about race and nothing but race” and passed with the intention of ensuring
white supremacy).
160. See id. at *332 (“[T]he amendments ratified in 1972 and 1978 were not
measures adopted for the purpose of depriving black public school students of
adequate funding for education.”).
161. Id. at *327.
162. Id. at *332.
163. I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 2014) (pointing to the
lower court’s extensive discussion of the state’s history of race relations).
164. See Montoy v. Kansas, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *7 (Kan.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 120 P.3d 306 (Kan. 2005)
(holding that compliance with Kansas Const. art. 9, §§ 1 and 2 could only be
achieved if sufficient funds were derived, through regular dependable taxes, to
permit district schools to provide basic education in a general and uniform system
of public schools.)
165. See id. at *9 (summarizing the arguments before the Kansas Supreme
Court and the questions on remand).
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funding systems.166 Indeed, Brown addressed a Kansas policy that
empowered cities with populations larger than 15,000 to operate
racially segregated schools.167 Brown invalidated this legislative
practice.168
In the aftermath of Brown, the state legislature enacted a
series of racially neutral state aid and district policies that had the
effect of perpetuating Kansas’s “separate and unequal” systems of
public education.169 Nine years after this decision, the state
legislature passed the School Unification Law of 1963, which
encouraged rural school districts to consolidate with each other.170
But these districts did not consolidate with nearby urban districts
with high concentrations of minority students.171 The legislature
in turn provided more funding to these consolidated rural districts
than their urban neighbors through state aid for low-enrollment
school districts.172 The state also provided more funding to
predominantly white suburbs than their urban counterparts
through state aid adjustments including “extraordinary growth”
and “new facilities aid,” designed to account for district growth.173
In the Montoy litigation, a state trial court issued a
preliminary order holding that the state’s funding disparities had
an unconstitutional disparate impact on minority and
English-learner students in violation of the state and federal equal
protection clauses.174 The court also ruled that the state had failed
166. See id. at *37 (“Plaintiffs . . . alleged that the total funds provided by the
Legislature, even if all its base allotments, weights, LOBs, capital outlays, sales
taxes, and other allowances and supplements are combined, [was] grossly
inadequate in the aggregate to provide a suitable education to all Kansas
children[.]”).
167. Green et al., supra note 12, at 306.
168. See id. at 306–07 (“Brown negated the legislature's ability to preserve
segregated schools within these city boundaries.”)
169. See id. at 307 (noting that “[t]he state legislature subsequently enacted
a series of funding and organizational policies that worked in tandem to create
racially unequal funding systems” after Brown).
170. See id. (stating that the School Unification Law of 1963 was designed to
decrease the number of school districts in the state).
171. See id. (explaining the effect of unification leading to de facto
segregation).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Montoy v. Kansas, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *49 (Kan. Dist.
Ct. Dec. 2, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 120 P.3d 306 (Kan. 2005) (“The Court
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to satisfy its duty under the education clause to provide Kansas’s
children with a “suitable education.”175 In reaching this latter
conclusion, the court observed with alarm the fact that “minorities,
disabled, [and] non English speakers . . . are failing at alarming
rates” on the state’s assessment system.”176 For example, “83.7
percent of Kansas African American students, 81.1 percent of
Kansas Hispanic students, 64.1 percent of Kansas Native
American students, 87.1 percent of Kansas limited English
proficiency students, and 77.5 percent of Kansas impoverished
students” were failing the tenth-grade mathematics assessment.177
The court also found that increases in educational funding
would enable districts to employ strategies, such as reducing class
sizes and hiring better trained teachers that could raise the
academic performance of minority and disadvantaged students.178
It also rejected the defendants’ attempt to justify the academic
performance of Kansas’s marginalized students with a reference to
lynchings:
Even more troublesome is Defendants’ well-phrased and
superficially attractive argument that even if one chooses to
examine alarming student failure rates of Kansas minorities,
poor, disabled, and limited English, one finds these failure rates
compare “favorably” with similar failure rates for such persons
elsewhere. Reduced to its simplest and clearest terms, this
argument suggests that there is “no problem” in Kansas since
our vulnerable and/or protected students aren’t performing any
worse than such students are performing elsewhere. This
argument seems to the Court to be on a par with the following
statement: “Persons of color should be comforted by the fact
that lynchings in Kansas are no more frequent than lynchings
in many other states.”179

hereby concludes, for all the reasons stated, but almost entirely as a matter of
fact, that the current school funding scheme stands in blatant violation of Article
6 of the Kansas Constitution and the equal protection clauses of both the Kansas
and United States Constitutions[.]”).
175. Id. at *43.
176. Id. at *40.
177. Id.
178. Id. at *48 (noting that the court believed the testimony of Kansas
educators regarding what resources they would need to successfully educate their
students).
179. Id. at *43.
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On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the lower
court’s finding that the school finance system violated state and
federal equal protection provisions.180 The court rejected the racial
disparity claim because the plaintiffs did not establish a
discriminatory purpose.181 But the court did agree with the finding
that the state school finance system “fails to provide adequate
funding for a suitable education for students of their and other
similarly situated districts, i.e., middle- and large-sized districts
with a high proportion of minority and/or at-risk and special
education students.”182 The major concern was that the formula
was based on political compromises that had “distorted” the
various cost adjustments, including those for low enrollment, at
risk, and bilingual education programs.183 In reaching this
decision, the court found that the state had failed to satisfy its own
definition of “a suitable provision for finance” of the public schools,
which was based on state accreditation standards and student
academic performance measures.184 The court also referenced a
legislatively-commissioned study which found that the school
finance system needed an additional $853 million to satisfy the
legislature’s standard.185
To satisfy the constitutional mandate, the court observed that
“[i]t is clear increased funding will be required; however, increased
funding may not in and of itself make the financing formula
constitutionally suitable.”186 Other considerations included “[t]he
equity with which the funds are distributed and the actual costs of
education, including appropriate levels of administrative costs.”187
The Kansas Supreme Court retained jurisdiction to give the
legislature time to correct the constitutional deficiencies with the
180. See Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 308 (2005) (reversing the district court
various grounds).
181. See id. (finding no discriminatory purpose necessary for equal protection
purposes).
182. Id. at 310.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 309.
185. See id. at 309–10 (discussing the Augenblick & Myers study as evidence
that suitable education is not being provided); see also Montoy, 2003 WL
22902963, at *39 (describing in further detail the same study).
186. Montoy, 120 P.3d at 310.
187. Id.
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current school funding formula.188 In the meantime, the current
school funding formula would remain in effect.189
Although the trial and state supreme court decisions
specifically cited the racial composition of the school districts that
received constitutionally inadequate funding, in subsequent
decisions, the Kansas Supreme Court mandated remedies in terms
of aggregate dollars.190 There was no reference to how this money
should be dispensed in a manner that targeted Black schools.191
C. Mississippi: Williams v. Reeves
In the ongoing Williams v. Reeves192 lawsuit, plaintiffs are
alleging that Mississippi has failed its educational obligations to
Black students under the Mississippi Readmission Act of 1870.193
The statute imposes a number of “fundamental conditions” for the
state’s readmission into the Union, including one that prohibited
the state from “amend[ing] or chang[ing]” its constitution in a
manner that “deprive[s] any citizens of the United States of the
school rights and privileges secured by the constitution of said
State.”194 The plaintiffs, who are low-income Black women whose
children attend state public schools, claim the present version of
the education clause violates the “school rights and privileges”
188. See id. (staying all further proceedings to allow the legislature the time
to take steps necessary to fulfill its “constitutional responsibility”).
189. See id. at 310–11 (withholding the formal opinion until corrective
legislation is enacted to ensure the legislature complies with the holding).
190. See Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 940 (Kan. 2005) (discussing Kansas
students and districts in general without reference to predominately Black
districts).
191. Id.
192. See Williams ex rel v. Bryant, No. 3:17-CV-404-WHB-LRA, 2019 WL
3757948 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 4, 2019), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub
nom. Williams ex rel v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 739 (5th Cir. 2020), reh’g denied,
981 F.3d 437 (en banc) (holding the Mississippi Constitution violated the
Mississippi Readmission Act but that the judicial declaration asked for could not
proceed under standing precedent).
193. See id. (discussing how the complaint alleges that amendments made to
the education clause of the Mississippi Constitution violate the Mississippi
Readmission Act and resulted in disparity in the education provided to students
attending either predominately white or predominately Black schools).
194. An Act to Admit the State of Mississippi to Representation in the
Congress of the United States 41st Cong. Ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (1870).
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provision of the statute.195 In 1987, the state amended the 1868
version of the education clause, which required the states to
establish “a uniform system of free public schools” by removing the
reference to uniformity.196 Thus, the education clause merely
imposes a duty on the legislature to provide a system of “free public
schools.”197 According to the plaintiffs, the deletion of the
uniformity requirement has “caused them to suffer a number of
injuries, including illiteracy, a diminished likelihood of high school
graduation, low rates of college attendance and college completion,
and an increased likelihood of future poverty.”198 A federal district
court dismissed the lawsuit because of Eleventh Amendment
immunity.199 But the Fifth Circuit reversed, pointing out that a
party may sue a state official in their official capacity if the suit
seeks prospective instead of retrospective relief.200 In an en banc
ruling, the Fifth Circuit refused to rehear the panel decision.201
D. New Mexico: Martinez v. New Mexico
In this consolidated lawsuit, the plaintiffs asserted that the
state had failed to provide at-risk students—including Native
American and English Language Learners (ELL)—an adequate
education pursuant to the State’s education clause requiring the
state to provide a “uniform system of public schools.”202 The

195. Williams II, 954 F.3d at 732.
196. Id. at 733.
197. See id. (referencing the 1987 version of the Mississippi Constitution).
198. Id.
199. See Williams I, 2019 WL 3757948 at *2 (finding that Mississippi would
be a real and substantial party in interest to the case because the requested
declaratory judgement would result in changes being made to the Mississippi
Constitution).
200. See Williams II, 954 F.3d at 738 (discussing that as long as the claim
seeks prospective relief for ongoing harm, the fact that a current violation can be
traced to a past action does not bar relief).
201. See Williams II, 981 F.3d at 437–38 (writing that eight judges voted in
favor of rehearing while nine judges voted against rehearing).
202. See Martinez v. New Mexico, No. D-101-CV-2014-00793, 2018 WL
9489378, at *2 (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 20, 2018) (discussing the constitutional
obligation of the state to provide sufficient education for children categorized as
“at-risk”).

SCHOOL FINANCE, RACE, AND REPARATIONS

513

plaintiffs also brought a state equal protection clause challenge
against the state.203
In 2018, a state trial court agreed with the plaintiffs’ education
clause claim, finding that the evidence showed that the education
provided to the state’s at-risk students was inadequate.204 The
court outlined the failure in terms of educational inputs, such as
instructional materials, reasonable curricula, and quality of
teaching.205 With respect to instructional materials, the court
referenced, inter alia, the defendants’ failure to comply with the
New Mexico Indian Education Act, a statute that required the
state to provide “culturally relevant instructional materials for
Native American students enrolled in public schools.”206 Districts
with significant Native American populations failed to achieve the
expected cooperation between district’s schools and tribal
communities.207 The court also took notice of the State
Department’s failure to fill positions instrumental in fulfilling the
statute’s purpose as well as the failure to develop
government-to-government relationship between the state and
New Mexico tribes.208
As to curriculum, the court took notice of the state’s failure to
provide programs to ELL students that would help them learn
English.209 The state constitution as well as state and federal
statutes required such programming for students who were not

203. See id. at *59–60 (discussing how case law rejects education-related
claims under the federal equal protection clause and that cases thereafter were
based on the clauses in most state constitutions interpreted to be equivalent to
the equal protection clause).
204. See id. at *25 (finding that New Mexico failed to meet the obligation to
provide every student with the opportunity to obtain an education that allows
them to become prepped for career or college).
205. See id. at *25–37 (analyzing both educational inputs and outputs to
determine whether the education provided is constitutionally adequate).
206. See id. at *27–28 (referencing failure to comply with the Act as
amounting to a violation of the constitution’s adequacy clause).
207. See id. at *28 (noting the goal of the Act has not been realized in most of
the districts with significant Native American student populations).
208. See id. at *28–29 (referencing the failure to fill three regional Indian
Education Department positions and lack of development of relationships to
achieve the statutory goals).
209. See id. at *31 (finding there is a lack of sufficient monitoring programs
to determine if ELL students receive adequate assistance).
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proficient in English.210 In addition, the state department of
education lacked sufficient monitoring to ensure that ELL
students were receiving adequate assistance in learning English
or to track the training provided to teachers of ELL students.211
Finally, the department had failed to provide a framework that the
district could use to provide multicultural education.212 With
respect to teaching, the court concluded that the quality of teaching
for at-risk students was inadequate.213 The state’s high-poverty
schools had a disproportionately high number of low-paid,
entry-level teachers.214 Furthermore, high poverty schools and
high ELL schools had fewer teachers rated effective or better than
their low poverty rate and low ELL counterparts.215 Moreover, the
state failed to provide funding that would lower student-teacher
ratios for ELL students to fifteen-to-one, which was ideal for
language attainment.216
The court also cited student outputs as evidence of the state’s
failure to provide a constitutionally adequate education.217 While
New Mexico’s children ranked at the bottom of the country in
terms of educational achievement, low-income Native American
and ELL students performed much worse.218 For instance, on state
standardized tests, the majority of the state’s fourth, eighth, and
eleventh graders were not proficient in math or reading.219 In
210. See id. (noting that such programs are required by legislation such as
bilingual programs, required action to overcome language barriers that prevent
equal participation, and by the state constitution).
211. See id. at *31–32 (finding that the Public Education Department did not
track training given to teachers who educate ELL students).
212. See id. at *32 (finding no provided framework for districts to use in
providing multicultural education).
213. See id. at *33 (concluding that the weight of the evidence shows the
quality of teaching for at-risk students is inadequate).
214. See id. (noting that it is well-recognized that inexperienced teachers are
systematically less effective than experienced teachers).
215. See id. (finding that teachers in those schools had lower average
evaluation scores).
216. See id. at *37 (citing research that shows ELL students benefit from
smaller class sizes and increased attention in the classroom).
217. See id. at *37–46 (classifying outputs as test results, graduation rates,
and frequency of need for remedial courses in college).
218. See id. at *37–38 (citing study measuring proficiency levels of students
in reading and math).
219. See id. at *37 (finding that, on average, these students were three years
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contrast, low-income, Native American and ELL students ranged
from four to fifteen percent proficiency on these tests.220 High
school graduation rates were another problematic educational
output.221 While New Mexico had the lowest graduation rate in the
country (fifty-four to seventy percent),222 the graduate rate for
Native Americans was much lower (forty-five to sixty-five
percent).223
The court found further evidence of failure in the college
remediation rates.224 About half of the state’s high school
graduates needed remediation and were, thus, not ready for
college.225 The need for remediation was even higher for Native
American students (fifty-nine percent) and Latinx students
(sixty-eight percent).226 The court attributed the inadequacy of the
educational system to insufficient funding.227 For example, it found
that parts of the school finance formula that were geared toward
ELL students, such as the at-risk factor and below-the-line
funding, were insufficient to meet the educational needs of ELL
students.228
The court also found that the school finance formula violated
the state equal protection clause with respect to ELL and
educationally disadvantaged students.229 The court concluded that
behind grade level).
220. Id. at *38.
221. See id. at *41 (discussing the consistently low high school graduation rate
in New Mexico, with the 2013–14 school year being the lowest in the United
States).
222. Id.
223. Id. at *42.
224. See id. (finding that many of the students who did go to college needed
substantial remedial help).
225. See id. at *42–43 (providing evidence in the form of witnesses for both
sides that testified students who have to take remedial coursework once arriving
to college are not college-ready).
226. See id. at *43 (citing report conducted by the Legislative Finance
Committee).
227. See id. at *45 (rejecting defendants’ position that additional recourses
cannot improve achievement by using evidence that money spent on classroom
instruction programs, extended school year, and quality teachers can improve the
performance of at-risk students).
228. See id. at *47–49 (discussing the complexity of the at-risk factor formula
and the lack of availability of below-the-line funding grants to all districts).
229. See id. at *62 (discussing how many state constitutions have equality
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Rodriguez was inapplicable because the state constitution
guaranteed a right to a “uniform system of free public schools.”230
Instead of rational basis analysis, the court determined that
intermediate scrutiny applied to the plaintiffs’ claim, meaning that
the classification had to be substantially related to an important
governmental interest.231 The current funding scheme failed this
standard of review because singling out educational disadvantaged
and ELL students for adverse treatment bore no substantial
relationship to any legitimate purpose to be achieved by the
educational funding system.232
The court issued an order requiring the defendants “to take
immediate steps to ensure that New Mexico schools have the
resources necessary to give at-risk students the opportunity to
obtain a uniform and sufficient education that prepares them for
college and career.”233 In June 2020, the trial court rejected a
motion by the defendants to dismiss the case, meaning that the
court would maintain jurisdiction of the case until the state
implemented the reforms required by the order.234
E. North Carolina: Silver v. Halifax County Board of
Commissioners
In Silver v. Halifax County Board of Commissioners,235
plaintiffs alleged that a board of county commissioners failed to
provide students in the county with a “sound basic education”
guaranteed by North Carolina’s education clause.236 This lawsuit
clauses specific to schools, which may guarantee uniform or thorough and efficient
public schools).
230. See id. at *61 (quoting the New Mexico Constitution).
231. See id. at *62 (ruling out rational basis because the review applies to
general social and economic legislation, not that which affects a fundamental or
important constitutional right or sensitive class).
232. See id. (elaborating on the substantially related to an important
government interest test needed to pass intermediate scrutiny).
233. Id. at *74.
234. See Martinez v. New Mexico, No. D-101-CV-2014-00793 (N.M. Dist. Ct.
Jul. 14, 2020) (retaining jurisdiction until New Mexico implements long-term,
comprehensive reforms consistent with the final order).
235. Silver v. Halifax Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 821 S.E.2d 755, 760 (N.C. 2018).
236. See id. at 756 (establishing that the state constitutional obligation to
provide a sound, basic education belongs to the state, not a county board of
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was similar to the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in
Leandro v. North Carolina.237 In that case, the court ruled that its
constitution imposed a duty on the state to provide every student
with such a right.238 The Silver plaintiffs, unlike those in the
Leandro case, claimed that the board maintained a tripartite
school district system in an efficient manner that resulted in the
defendants’ failure to provide the Black school districts in the
county with a sound basic education.239
In support of this claim, the plaintiffs compared the inputs and
outputs provided to the two overwhelmingly Black districts—
Halifax County Public Schools (HCPS) and Weldon City Schools
(WCS)—with those provided to the predominantly white district—
Roanoke Rapids Graded School District (RRGSD).240 With respect
to inputs, the plaintiffs stated that school buildings were “woefully
inadequate”; students in one high school had to “walk through
sewage to move between classes because of defective plumbing”;
and students frequently lacked textbooks and other curricular
materials.241 In contrast, the facilities of the white school district
were “well kept and regularly renovated.”242 Students also had
access to advanced placement classes and other curricular and
extra-curricular programs not available to the Black districts.243
Because of these disparities, the plaintiffs asserted that it was
commissioners).
237. See id. (determining the case is distinguishable from the landmark
decision); see also Leandro v. North Carolina, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997)
(holding that the right to education provided in the state constitution is
qualitative and encompasses the right to sound basic education).
238. See Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255 (concluding the North Carolina
Constitution guarantees every child of the state the opportunity to sound basic
education, including a qualitatively adequate education).
239. See Silver, 821 S.E.2d at 757–58 (alleging the continued support of the
system and refusal to manage and distribute resources efficiently among the
districts resulted in failure).
240. See id. (showing HCPS’s student population as eighty-five percent Black
and four percent white, WCS’s student population as ninety-four percent Black
and four percent white, and RRGSD as twenty-six percent Black and sixty-five
percent white).
241. Id. at 758.
242. Id.
243. See id. (discussing availability of a wide variety of activities for RRGSD
students while HCPS and WCS teachers often rely on donations from parents to
purchase books and classroom materials).
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difficult for HPCS and WCS to attract and retain “quality, or even
fully licensed, teachers and administrators.”244 Indeed, they
frequently had to resort to hiring teachers from the Teach for
America program or very inexperienced teachers.245
According to the plaintiffs, these disparities were caused by
the defendant’s system of local sales tax distribution for
education.246 Legislation empowered county commissioners to
choose between two methods of distributing local sales tax to
provide additional funding to school districts.247 The first was the
per capita method, which called for local sales tax revenue to be
distributed to all municipalities based on the resident population
of each.248 The second was the ad valorem method, in which local
sales tax revenue is divided among all taxing entities.249 The board
always chose the ad valorem method, which the plaintiffs alleged
caused the white school district to receive more educational
funding than their Black counterparts.250 As to outputs, the
plaintiffs asserted that HCPS and WCS students scored
substantially below RRGSD students on end-of-course tests and a
majority of HCPS and WCS students scored below grade level on
state standardized tests.251 Moreover, students from HCPS and
WCS schools consistently scored 150 to 250 points lower on the
SAT exam.252
The Board moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that
the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

244. Id.
245. See id. (noting the percentage of fully licensed teachers in the two
predominantly Black districts ranged from sixty-three to eighty-nine percent).
246. See id. (theorizing reasons for the discrepancy in the quality of education
available).
247. See id. (discussing the General Assembly enacted legislation that gives
the defendant the choice of two distribution options).
248. See id. (citing North Carolina General Statute § 105-472(b)(1)).
249. See id. (citing North Carolina General Statute § 105-472(b)(2)).
250. See id. (discussing how HCPS does not have supplemental property tax
and is therefore not a taxing entity, receiving no money from the ad valorem
method).
251. See id. (showing that students in HCPS and WCS schools score fifteen to
thirty percent lower than RRGSD schools on tests).
252. See id. at 758–59 (discussing another statistic to show disparities within
the school districts).
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granted.253 The trial court granted this motion and the state court
of appeals affirmed.254 The state supreme court upheld the lower
courts’ ruling on the ground that the state, not the county board of
commissioners, had the obligation to provide a sound basic
education.255
VI. Part V: Reparations Framework for State Legislation
Thus far, we explained how local property taxation, state aid
policies, and stealth inequities have worked together to create
Black-white disparities in school funding post-Brown.256 We also
observed that the Supreme Court further encouraged this gap by
(1) upholding the constitutionality of local property taxation in
Rodriguez; (2) prohibiting the court-mandated desegregation of
metropolitan areas in Milliken I; and (3) authorizing limited
reparations plans for Black urban communities in Milliken II.257
We have also observed that recent school finance litigation has
begun to target policies that have caused racial funding
disparities.258 This race-conscious school finance litigation
promises to put a stop to policies that have caused Black-white
school funding disparities.259 However, this litigation strategy does
not provide a remedy for losses in school funding over the years
and the funding gap experienced by predominantly Black schools
and their communities.260 Can reparations litigation provide relief
for this latter injury?

253. See id. at 759 (moving to dismiss the plaintiffs’ request of a declaratory
judgement to order the implementation of a plan to cure alleged violations of
fundamental rights to education).
254. See id. (noting that no provision of the North Carolina Constitution
affirmatively requires a board of county commissioners to implement and
maintain a public education system in the county in which it sits).
255. See id. at 760 (using the clear and unambiguous language of the state
constitution to determine that no express provision requires boards of county
commissioners to provide for or preserve any rights relating to education).
256. See supra Part II.
257. See supra Part III.
258. See supra Part IV.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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Probably not. Plaintiffs have made several attempts to obtain
reparations through litigation.261 These attempts have been
largely unsuccessful.262 Indeed, “reparations litigation has been all
but abandoned.”263 According to Kindaka Jamal Sanders, standing
poses a particularly formidable barrier to reparations-based
litigation:
The standing problem produces several challenges to
reparations-related litigation. The first problem relates to
individual claims of current injuries stemming from slavery.
The standing doctrine requires that the injury alleged by the
plaintiff be his own and not that of another. Thus, African
Americans are prevented from maintaining a suit based
exclusively on the enslavement of their ancestors. The harm to
the plaintiff has to be personal. The standing doctrine has also
been interpreted to limit claims of group injury or injuries
deriving from stigmatization.264

Because litigation provides an incomplete remedy for the
damage caused to Black communities and the schools that serve
them, reparations must be achieved through legislation, not
litigation.265 Robert Westley explains the advantages of
legislative-based reparations in the following passage:
Legislatures, it may be argued, provide a friendlier forum for
racial redress for both formal and substantive reasons.
Formally, although their actions may be subject to judicial
review, they are not constrained by judicial doctrines of
standing, deference, timing or res judicata. Each of these
doctrines might impact negatively any lawsuit seeking Black
261. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun Kim, & Abigail M. Holden,
American Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV.
1, 22—23 (2007) (discussing how the case for reparations fit within
well-established legal principals such as traditional tort law framework and
contract claims).
262. See id. at 24 (stating that the “staccato failure” of recent lawsuits lends
a sense that the use of tort and contract law were misfits in the reparations
context).
263. Kindaka Jamal Sanders, Re-Assembling Osiris: Rule 23, the Black
Farmers Case, and Reparations, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 339, 346 (2013).
264. Id. at 347.
265. See Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is it Time to Reconsider the
Case for Black Reparations?, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429, 434–35 (1998)
(considering the recent revival of the reparations principle through legislation
aimed towards Holocaust survivors whose assets were illegally confiscated by
Swiss banks in the aftermath of World War II).
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reparations. The claim of reparations, although constructively
taking the form of a traditional lawsuit, e.g., Victims of Racism
v. The Government that Failed to Protect Them, inevitably
presents issues, some of them political, that many courts would
find difficult, if not impossible, to resolve. By contrast,
legislatures may hold hearings, make findings, and pass
resolutions or laws on any matter affecting the public interest
and within the scope of constitutional power. Substantively,
legislatures provide a friendlier forum than courts for racial
remedies, even during periods of backlash, because of their
ability to enact comprehensive solutions to diffuse social ills,
such as racial discrimination, and the inherent susceptibility of
legislators not only to constituent pressure but also to trading
votes. Moreover, historically it has been legislatures, not courts,
that have in fact initiated the most comprehensive remedies to
racial subordination, Brown v. Board of Education and its
progeny notwithstanding.266

One can find further support for the benefits of
legislative-based reparations in Virginia’s Brown v. Board of
Education Scholarship Program (Brown Fund Act)267—which has
been called the country’s first civil rights reparations program in
the country.268 This legislation was enacted in response to the
state’s program of massive resistance in the wake of the Brown
case.269 At that time, the state passed several laws to circumvent
desegregation including the creation of voucher programs that
white students could use to attend segregated, private schools.270
Pursuant to this authority, Prince Edward County closed its
schools from 1959–1964 and provided vouchers for its white
266. Id. at 435–36.
267. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-231.1–10 (2020).
268. See Ken Woodley, Virginia is Proof That Reparations for Slavery Can
Work,
WASH.
POST
(Jul.
19,
2019,
11:24
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/virginia-is-proof-that-reparations-forslavery-can-work/2019/07/19/11aceaaa-a25b-11e9-b73241a79c2551bf_story.html (quoting “civil rights icon” Julian Bond remarking on
the passing) [perma.cc/3ZCV-V7KU].
269. See Committee Information, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUC. SCHOLARSHIP
COMM., http://brownscholarship.virginia.gov/committee.asp (discussing how
refusal of Virginia public schools to desegregate led to legislative action)
[perma.cc/2Y7N-CDGH].
270. See Daniel Peter Kuehn, Accommodation Within the Broad Structure of
Voluntary Society: Buchanan and Nutter on School Segregation (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3308162
(discussing
attempts to continue school segregation) [perma.cc/3QYQ-44UL].

522

27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 483 (2021)

students to use for segregation academies.271 However, the county
provided no educational opportunities for Black students during
this period.272 The Supreme Court eventually found this county’s
actions unconstitutional in Griffin v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County,273 but the five-year closing of schools
affected Black residents in ways “that still haunt them as adults,”
such as the failure to obtain a high school diploma and the inability
to pursue career goals.274
The Brown Fund Act seeks to remedy this wrong by providing
financial support to present-day Virginia residents who were
enrolled in the state’s public schools between 1954 and 1964, in
jurisdictions that closed their schools to avoid desegregation.275
Specifically, eligible students could use the fund to help them
obtain:
[T]he adult high school diploma; a passing score on a high school
equivalency examination approved by the Board of Education;
College-Level Examination Program (CLEP) credit; career or
technical education or training in an approved program at a
comprehensive community college or at an accredited career
and technical education postsecondary school in the
Commonwealth; an undergraduate degree from an accredited
associate-degree-granting or baccalaureate (i) private
institution of higher education or (ii) public institution of higher
education; a graduate degree at the masters or doctoral level;
or a professional degree from an accredited baccalaureate
271. See Chris Ford, Stephenie Johnson, & Lisette Partelow, The Racist
Origins of Private School Vouchers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 12, 2017, 11:59
PM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k12/reports/2017/07/12/435629/racist-origins-private-school-vouchers/ (discussing
the history of the voucher program) [perma.cc/7X6B-2PE5].
272. See Leo Casey, When Privatization Means Segregation: Setting the
Record Straight on School Vouchers, DISSENT (Aug 9, 2017),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/private-school-vouchers-racisthistory-milton-friedman-betsy-devos (examining the resistance of desegregating
and lack of available educational opportunities for Black students)
[perma.cc/L6KS-JSKY].
273. See Griffin v. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964)
(holding that closing the public schools of the county while contributing to the
support of private segregated white schools denied Black school children equal
protection of the laws).
274. Verna L. Williams, Reading, Writing, and Reparations: Systemic Reform
of Public Schools as a Matter of Justice, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 419, 441 (2006).
275. See VA. CODE ANN. § 30-231.1–10 (2020) (establishing financial support
for those desegregation effected in the fifties and sixties).
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private institution of higher education in the Commonwealth or
baccalaureate public institution of higher education in the
Commonwealth.276

Since the statute’s passage, nearly 250 persons have received
financial support ranging “from a 65-year-old man, locked out of
school after first grade, who wanted to learn phonics and cursive
writing, to some who have gone on to earn college and graduate
degrees.”277 While providing monetary reparations to those
persons who have suffered from massive resistance should be part
of the effort of a state to redress its wrongs, such funding alone is
insufficient to address the educational harms suffered by Black
students and communities.278 Indeed, Verna Williams in her
critique of the Brown Fund Act states: “[I]n light of the state’s
history of segregating tax dollars and funneling most public
revenues to White schools, lawmakers should develop a system of
school funding that ensures equitable funding for facilities and
resources at all schools.”279 We would also add that Virginia and
other states should include provisions designed to address the
harm done to predominantly Black schools and the communities
they serve.280 The remainder of this part lays out a framework for
school finance reparations that state legislators could adopt and
provides specific examples using state data.281 It concludes with a
discussion of the constitutionality of the plan under the Equal
Protection Clause.
A. Four-Part Reparations Framework
The persistent effects of Black-white racial segregation and
housing discrimination affect education systems and school
finance specifically in numerous ways.282 Our reparations plan
276. Id.
277. Woodley, supra note 268.
278. See id. (discussing the ongoing need for the United States to address the
harms of slavery).
279. Williams, supra note 274, at 472–73.
280. See id. at 472 (showing how reforming education would be difficult, but
the right thing to do).
281. See infra A. Four-Part Reparations Framework.
282. See PHILLIP TEGELER & MICHAEL HILTON, DISRUPTING THE RECIPROCAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOUSING AND SCHOOL SEGREGATION 2 (2017) (showing
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focuses on four specific effects of housing discrimination and
financial remedies for those effects:
1. Lost property tax revenues due to depressed values;
2. Inequitable taxation in the form of higher tax rates adopted
to offset revenue losses;
3. School finance policies which capitalize on and/or reinforce
historical disparities;
4. Increased costs of achieving common outcome goals for
children in the presence of racial isolation.

First, restrictive covenants in deeds, redlining, racial bias in
mortgage lending, all interconnected with federal and state
housing policies, as laid out in Richard Rothstein’s Color of Law,
have led to dramatic differences in accumulated real estate wealth
and current residential property values of Black individuals and
Black communities.283 Local public-school district boundaries,
which define taxing jurisdictions for funding public schools, often
serve as dividing lines between high value residential properties
owned by whites, immediately adjacent to low value residential
properties owned for generations by Blacks.284 These differences in
the average values of residential properties between
predominantly Black and predominantly white school districts
lead to vastly different ability of those districts to raise revenues
from property taxes.285 These differences result directly from
decades of government endorsed and enabled racial segregation.286
Racial restrictions were introduced into and maintained in deeds
specifically to preserve the value of homes in white
neighborhoods.287
how housing discrimination and school policy are tied together).
283. See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 51 (documenting the history of
racial disparity in the United States).
284. See Karin E. Kitchens, Dividing Lines: The Role School District
Boundaries Play in Spending Inequality for Public Education, 102 SOC. SCI. Q.
468, 474 (2020) (highlighting the differences taxes cause in education).
285. See id. (explaining how higher priced property collects more revenue at
a lower tax rate).
286. See id. at 488 (noting that districts are separated along racial lines).
287. See Colin Gordon, St. Louis Blues: The Urban Crisis in the Gateway City,
33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 81, 85 (2013) (explaining how race restrictive deeds
uphold segregation).
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Other factors partially mitigate these disparities in local
revenue raising capacity. One example occurs where affluent white
neighborhoods and high value commercial shopping districts
remain within the boundaries of the school district which serves a
majority Black population.288 For example, Kansas City was forced
to pay for its own desegregation remedies through a significant
increase in local tax levy.289 Other major urban centers have
similar advantages to the extent that significant tax abatements
have not minimized the taxable values of commercial properties.290
But more residential urban districts like Baltimore or Philadelphia
and inner urban fringe neighborhoods relegated for Black
homeowners lack these advantages.
Some states, primarily southern states, operate countywide
school systems which leads to fewer sharply racially divided taxing
jurisdictions.291 But even then, in some of these states, Black cities
and towns at the center of these counties are carved out as
separate, segregated independent taxing jurisdictions.292 One
notable example is Baltimore City.293 As such, the race gap in local
property tax revenues varies widely from state to state and in some
cases from region to region within states.
State school finance systems typically include a general
formula aid component of which a primary goal is equalization of
revenues based on differences in local wealth and income—many
288. See Green & Baker, supra note 134, at 64 (showing how predominantly
white shopping centers and country clubs increased the value of the entire school
district).
289. See id. at 73 (keeping in place the court ordered tax levy).
290. See id. at 64 (showing the effect of high value residential and commercial
properties on taxes).
291. See ILL. STATE UNIV. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF EDUC. POL’Y., COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICTS: RESEARCH AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 9 (ILL. STATE UNIV.
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF EDUC. POL’Y, ed., 2009) (listing Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, and South Carolina as countywide school systems).
292. See Lionel Foster, “The Black Butterfly” Racial Segregation and
Investment Patterns in Baltimore, URB. INST. (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://apps.urban.org/features/baltimore-investmentflows/?fbclid=IwAR0uKWoIjA1JclJtceAQzGm6xl6Mv5vROchWRWy_gcCfq9N0sFuIyNml7Y (attributing the racial divide in cities
and neighborhoods to the Federal Housing Administration) [perma.cc/2T83FYBP].
293. See id. (calling Baltimore City the “black butterfly” due to the rampant
segregation).
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exclusively focused on differences in taxable property wealth.294
That is:
[State General Formula Aid = Foundation Funding Target –
Local Revenue Raised at Equitable Taxation]

The foundation funding target may either be a singular
spending per pupil target, or may be adjusted to account for
various need and cost factors.295 These latter, additional
adjustments may either work in favor of, or in opposition to,
driving additional resources to Black communities and children.296
Whether including additional factors or not, general formula aid
programs often fail to mitigate entirely Black-white disparities in
school district revenues.297 Mitigating these disparities, now and
henceforth (and perhaps retroactively) is part I of our reparations
framework:
Compensation for lost property tax revenues: Upon calculating
the Black-white difference in local revenues which arise from
historical forces of real estate segregation, then adding the
difference in state general formula aid (existing compensation),
we can identify the remaining gap in revenues for the Black
child and for the white child in any state. States should be
required to allocate this additional margin of funding per Black
child based on Black enrollments across all districts.

As noted above, local tax revenues per Black child in many
states are less than local tax revenues per white child because local
property values are lower—even for otherwise similar structures—
in predominantly Black neighborhoods than in white
neighborhoods.298 Often, however, the margin of difference in
294. See BRUCE D. BAKER. MATHEW DI CARLO, & MARK WEBER, THE ADEQUACY
AND FAIRNESS OF STATE SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEMS 2 (2019),
https://www.shankerinstitute.org/resource/adequacy-and-fairness-state-schoolfinance-systems (introducing the generic school finance system formula)
[perma.cc/FC8Q-STUK].
295. See id. at 4 (highlighting the different factors that weigh in to cost of
education in schools).
296. See id. at 3 (comparing two similar school districts and showing how
inequality can arise).
297. See id. at 2 (using three core principles to create a new and more
equitable system of school finance).
298. See ANDRE PERRY, JONATHAN ROTHWELL, & DAVID HARSHBARGER, THE
DEVALUATION OF ASSETS IN BLACK NEIGHBORHOODS 11 (2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018.11_Brookings-
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revenue is less than it would be under equal taxation.299 Black
communities and homeowners in many cases are paying a higher
effective tax rate on their properties to raise less revenue than
their white neighbors in the next district over.300 Save for another
day the fact that Black homeowners are also likely paying
significant additional fees and higher interest rates on their
mortgages than even white homeowners in the same districts.301
The assumption behind a general aid formula is that foundation
spending levels should be attainable at equal taxation.
Our first component offsets only the remaining gap in
revenues to school districts without considering the possible
differences in unequal taxation between Black and white
homeowners.302 Our second component begins by calculating the
average difference in effective tax rates paid by Black versus white
homeowners and provides a rebate for the higher price in taxes
paid by Black homeowners.
Compensation for inequitable residential taxation: Rebates to
Black property taxpayers covering Black-white differential in
effective tax rate.

Structurally, this program is similar to state aid programs
which have been used to buy down the tax rates for fixed or lower
income households in affluent, high spending, high taxing school
districts, like New York’s STAR tax relief program.303 The
difference is that those programs in fact reinforce racial disparities
Metro_Devaluation-Assets-Black-Neighborhoods_final.pdf (valuing homes in
Black neighborhoods at roughly half of homes with no Black residents)
[perma.cc/J952-UDC5].
299. See BAKER, DI CARLO, & WEBER, supra note 294, at 16 (comparing the
difference in revenue between two separate districts).
300. See Kitchens, supra note 284, at 6 (showing the difference in tax rates
due to segregation).
301. See John Yinger, Discrimination in Mortgage Lending: A Literature
Review, in Mortgage Lending, Racial Discrimination and Federal Policy, in
MORTGAGE LENDING, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, AND FEDERAL POLICY 29 (John
Goering & Ron Wienk eds., 1997) (highlighting the higher interest rates Black
homeowners regularly face).
302. See BAKER, DI CARLO, & WEBER, supra note 294, at 17 (listing the
differences in revenue for school systems between states).
303. See Tae Ho Eom & Kiernan Killeen, Reconciling State Aid for Property
Tax Relief for Urban Schools: Birthing a New STAR in New York State, 40 EDUC.
& URB. SOC. 36, 43 (2007) (giving a brief overview of the STAR program).
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and reward communities that have high property values due to
past segregation.304 States have a variety of features of their aid
programs which specifically reward districts by driving more aid,
or providing more local revenue raising authority to those districts
that have benefited historically from racial residential
segregation.305 Perhaps the most obvious and egregious among
these is Kansas’s policy of raising local revenue caps for the
districts with the highest priced houses—districts that primarily
serve the white suburbs of Kansas City—a region that was a
national model for the use of Homeowners Associations (HoAs) as
method of enforcing racial restrictions.306 That is, these districts
are permitted to raise more revenue specifically because Black
homeowners were (and still largely are) kept out.307 This brings us
to our third component:
Reversal of school finance and aid distribution policies built
explicitly on prior, systemic racism and commensurate
repayment to affected school districts.

Revenues raised through these programs should be redistributed
to neighboring districts serving large Black populations.
The final component of our reparations plan is more
complicated, and addressed in our prior work. The creation of
Black racial isolation through restrictive housing policies led to a
unique form of concentrated Black urban poverty which has had
intergenerational adverse influence on short-term achievement
and long-term economic outcomes for children raised in these
communities.308 Bruce Baker and Preston Green have estimated in
prior work the additional costs associated with achieving outcome
equity in racially isolated Black communities.309 States should be
304. See id. (outlining the issues with the STAR program).
305. Baker & Corcoran, supra note 78 (rewarding districts for having a
history of racial segregation).
306. Gordon, supra note 287 (showing how race restrictive deeds uphold
segregation).
307. Id. (explaining how race restrictive deeds keep Black property values
down).
308. See Bruce D. Baker, Exploring the Sensitivity of Education Costs to
Racial Composition of Schools and Race-Neutral Alternative Measures, 86
PEABODY J. EDUC. 58, 73 (2011) (displaying a table showing the adverse effect of
poverty on achievement).
309. See generally Bruce D. Baker & Preston C. Green III, Equal Educational
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obligated to include in their cost adjustments for funding formulas,
a factor that compensates for the additional costs of remedying
outcomes for students in racially isolated, Black school districts.
B. Examples
1. Lost Property Tax Revenues Due to Depressed Values
For the first component, the first step is to calculate the local
revenue per white child in a state and local revenue per Black child
in a state, to determine the magnitude of the gap, if any, between
the two.
[Local Revenue per White Child - Local Revenue per Black
Child = Local Revenue Gap]

The second step is to calculate the extent to which state general
formula aid compensates for this gap and whether a remaining
racial gap is left after including state general formula aid. Table 1
provides a summary of the past decade for three states with
persistent remaining racial gaps. In Maryland, the average local
revenue per Black child is over $2,000 less per pupil in most years
than the average local revenue per white child.310 But the average
state general formula aid is less than $1,000 more per Black child
than per white child, covering less than half the gap and leaving a
reparations margin of nearly $1,500 per pupil.311 To a large extent,
the Maryland gap is a function of the separation of Baltimore City
from the county governance structure.312 Gaps are also persistent
in Virginia, a state where a number of majority Black “city”
districts are carved out from county systems.
Connecticut remains one of the most segregated northeastern
states, and a state that has put less effort into providing school

Opportunity and the Distribution of Educational Opportunity and the
Distribution of State Aid to Schools: Can or Should School Racial Composition
Be a Factor?, 34 J. EDUC. FIN 289 (2009).
310. See infra Table 1. States with Large Persistent Black-White Revenue Gaps
(showing the local revenue gap to be $2,173).
311. See id (showing the margin to be $1,497).
312. FOSTER, supra note 292.
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funding equity than others.313 The local revenue gap for the
average Black versus white child in Connecticut is huge.314 While
the state general formula aid margin is larger in Connecticut than
in Virginia or Maryland, the remaining reparations margin in
Connecticut in recent years is the largest.
Table 1. States with Large Persistent Black-White Revenue
Gaps315
State General
Formula Aid DIF
(BLACK – WHITE)

Maryland
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Virginia
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Local Property Tax
Revenue GAP
(WHITE – BLACK)

Remaining
Reparations
Margin

$1,118
$853
$805
$608
$649
$774
$648
$711
$708
$733
$710

$2,809
$2,609
$2,471
$2,293
$1,970
$1,700
$2,034
$2,373
$1,907
$2,022
$2,173

$1,821
$1,821
$1,722
$1,791
$1,408
$987
$1,475
$1,730
$1,232
$1,324
$1,497

$475
$526
$442
$284
$312
$266
$272
$288
$279
$300

$1,442
$1,348
$1,387
$1,210
$1,187
$1,261
$1,281
$1,268
$1,255
$1,257

$1,041
$852
$977
$984
$933
$1,061
$1,074
$1,021
$1,003
$982

313. See GARY ORFIELD & JONGYEON EE, CONNECTICUT SCHOOL INTEGRATION
MOVING FORWARD AS THE NORTHEAST RETREATS 31 (2015) (showing severe
segregation in schools).
314. See id. at 13 (highlighting the extreme difference in communities’
wealth).
315. Data Sources: Compiled by author using school district level panel, from:
Bruce D. Baker, Matthew Di Carlo, Ajay Srikanth, & Mark Weber, SCHOOL
FINANCE
INDICATORS
DATABASE
(2020),
http://schoolfinancedata.org/
[perma.cc/5HHX-MAAS].
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Connecticut
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

531

$300

$1,294

$1,016

$2,624
$2,796
$2,435
$2,370
$2,775
$2,645
$2,568
$2,470
$2,508
$2,557
$2,756

$3,168
$3,034
$3,071
$3,365
$3,390
$3,732
$3,941
$4,108
$4,015
$4,319
$4,295

$586
$247
$658
$1,058
$656
$1,160
$1,461
$1,707
$1,549
$1,808
$1,574

Revenue variables derived from U.S. Census Fiscal Survey of Local
Governments, where local revenue includes revenue from school
district local property taxes and local revenue from city, parent
government property taxes. State aid includes only state general
formula aid. Racial composition from National Center for
Education Statistics Common Core of Data, Public Education
Agency Universe Survey.
2. Inequitable Taxation in the Form of Higher Tax Rates Adopted
to Offset Revenue Losses
Table 1 reveals the extent of local revenue gaps in Maryland,
Virginia and Connecticut. These three states were found to have
the largest persistent gaps among states with significant Black
populations.316 In Connecticut, for example, the average local
revenue per Black child is over $4,000 per pupil less than the
average local revenue per white child.317 In many cases, Black
homeowners are paying even higher effective tax rates on their
homes than white homeowners just to get the gaps this small.318
The revenue gaps would be larger at equitable taxation.319 Blacks
are paying a tax penalty in addition to facing a revenue deficit,
316. See supra Table 1. States with Large Persistent Black-White Revenue
Gaps.
317. See id. (showing the average gap in revenue between white and Black
children is $4,925).
318. Id.
319. Id.
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because of housing segregation.320 Black communities may also
face other elevated costs related to maintenance of aging
infrastructure and public safety, leading to higher cumulative
property taxes.
Table 2 summarizes data on housing values and property
taxes paid, calculated with individual household level data for
Black and white households in the American Community Survey
from 2005 to 2018.321 Data are by metropolitan area, including
metro areas within the states addressed in Table 1. In the
Baltimore metro area Black homes are, on average, valued at
about $150,000 less than white homes.322 Property taxes paid on
Black homes tend to be about $1,000 less, but this still leads to a
higher effective tax rate.323 One might calculate the average
“reparations rebate” payment to Black households as the
difference in the tax bill that would be paid on the Black home if
the white effective tax rate was used.324 For example, in Bridgeport
for a home valued at $340,000:
Black Tax Rate – White Tax Rate = .53%
.53%
×
$340k
=
$1,802
Black Tax
Black Home
Black Homeowner
Value
Rebate

Similarly, in Baltimore on a $240,000 home, a $1,080 rebate (.45%
rebate).
Table 2. Black Tax by Metropolitan Area325
Housing
Value

Property
Taxes

Effective
Rate

320. Id.
321. See infra Table 2. Black Tax by Metropolitan Area (displaying the
property taxes paid in Black and white households).
322. See id. (showing the difference in home values to be $154,010).
323. See id. (showing the difference in property taxes to be $1,004).
324. Id.
325. Data Source: Calculated using American Community Survey annual
samples from 2005–2018 from Steven Ruggles, Sarah Flood, Ronald Goeken,
Josiah Grover, Erin Meyer, Jose Pacas, & Matthew Sobek, IPUMS USA: Version
10.0, IPUMS (2020), https://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V10.0 [perma.cc/K4WKFH2K].
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Baltimore-ColumbiaTowson, MD

White

$391,996

$3,557

1.41%

Black

$237,986

$2,553

1.86%

Bridgeport-StamfordNorwalk, CT

White

$735,471

$7,310

2.00%

Black

$339,384

$5,546

2.53%

Hartford-West HartfordEast Hartford, CT

White

$307,296

$5,395

2.30%

Black

$224,367

$4,226

2.70%

White

$322,175

$5,515

2.35%

Black

$221,543

$4,792

3.20%

White

$317,542

$2,630

1.23%

Black

$226,616

$1,965

1.37%

White

$303,926

$2,391

1.13%

Black

$197,754

$1,631

1.23%

White

$539,631

$4,603

1.29%

Black

$400,178

$3,449

1.40%

New Haven-Milford, CT
Virginia Beach-NorfolkNewport News, VA-NC
Richmond, VA
Washington-ArlingtonAlexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV

Table 3 shows that even if we control for housing unit size, by
number of bedrooms, year of data, and metropolitan area within
state, housing values for Black families in Connecticut and
Maryland are over $140k less than housing values for white
families.326 Total tax bills are lower, but effective tax rates still
higher. These margins, however, are smaller than in Table 2 and
would lead to smaller rebates. However, it is questionable as to
whether such a policy should discount the rebate for the fact that
whites in suburbs tend to live in larger homes (with more
bedrooms).327

326.

See infra

Table 3. Conditional Analysis of Housing Value, Taxes and Tax Rate Differences
(compiling the housing value, property taxes and effective rate of several cities).
327. Id.
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Table 3. Conditional Analysis of Housing Value, Taxes and Tax
Rate Differences
2005–2018
Housing Value*
coef
se
$2,887
$173,247
Maryland
$938
$143,982
Virginia
-$93,721
$847
*Controlling for year, no. of
bedrooms and metro area
Connecticut

Taxes

Effective Rate
coef
se

coef

se

$1,096

$15

0.449%

0.084%

-$737

$6

0.297%

0.033%

-$682

$6

0.076%

0.032%

3. School Finance Policies Which Capitalize on and/or Reinforce
Historical Disparities
The third component of school finance reparations requires
more detailed auditing of state aid programs. Bruce Baker and
Preston Green wrote back in 2005 about how states have created
features of their state school finance systems which reinforce racial
disparities.328 Specific examples included an Alabama provision
which determined aid based on the degree levels held by teachers,
which had been built on a previous program based on lower unit
costs for Black versus white teachers.329 The former largely
reinforced the latter when the shift was made because Black
teachers, generally in Black schools had not been provided
opportunities to seek higher degrees at the same rate as white
teachers.330 Another example involved an adjustment to local
revenue caps adopted in Kansas, called a “cost of living”
adjustment, which increased the cap, by providing additional
“weighted pupil” counts in the formula, for the seventeen districts
with the highest housing prices.
328. See generally Bruce D. Baker & Preston C. Green III, Tricks of the Trade:
State Legislative Actions in School Finance Policy That Perpetuate Racial
Disparities in the Post-Brown Era, 111 AM. J. EDUC. 372 (2005).
329. See id. at 384 (summarizing the disparity in teachers’ pay because of
their education level).
330. See id. (indicating that black teachers are 59% less likely to hold master’s
degrees).
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These programs capitalize on racial segregation, from de jure
school segregation in Alabama, to carefully orchestrated racial
residential segregation in Johnson and Wyandotte County
Kansas.331 Put bluntly, the reason why homes in some districts in
Kansas are valued higher than homes in neighboring districts is
because of racial restrictions enforced through HOAs.332 Further,
there is no justification that these policies represent any real needs
or costs.333 As the Kansas courts explained:
We held that the new cost-of-living property tax provision was
not based on any evidence that there was any link between high
housing costs and higher education costs or that the 17 districts
that would benefit from the provision pay higher teacher
salaries. We noted that the evidence at trial demonstrated the
opposite—that the districts with high-poverty, high at-risk
student populations are the ones that need help attracting and
retaining teachers.334

But because the adjustment was added while the case was already
at the appellate court, it was allowed to remain as part of the
funding formula and persists to this day.335 Moving forward, and
perhaps even retroactively, these revenues should be shared across
districts that were inappropriately advantaged and those that
were adversely affected.
Table 4 shows the effect of the Kansas “cost of living”
adjustment across Johnson and Wyandotte County school
districts. The policy adds “weighted pupils” to calculate a higher
general funding level, and in turn raises the cap on additional
(supplemental) local revenue raising.336 For Johnson County
districts like Blue Valley, Shawnee Mission and Olathe that
amounts to a seven percent or more increase.337 Kansas City,
Kansas, where Blacks were relegated to homeownership, which
remains twenty-seven percent Black (and majority Hispanic)
331. See id. at 388 (explaining the segregation practices in Kansas).
332. Gordon, supra note 287.
333. See Montoy v. Kansas, 138 P.3d 755, 758 (Kan. 2006) (noting high
poverty students need help).
334. Id.
335. See Baker & Green, supra note 328, at 404 (outlining the court’s
reasoning).
336. Infra Table 4. Effects of Kansas “Cost of Living” Adjustment.
337. See id. (showing the percentage increases to be 7.07%, 7.79% and 6.71%).
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receives no adjustment despite sharing a boundary with Shawnee
Mission.
Table 4. Effects of Kansas “Cost of Living” Adjustment
County

District
Name

%
Black

Adjusted
Enrollment

Cost of
Living
WTD FTE

%
Increase

$ Increase
(per Adj.
Enrollment)

3%

22,329

1,579

7.07%

$314

3,073

-

0.00%

$0

Johnson

Blue
Valley

Johnson

Spring
Hill

Johnson

Gardner
Edgerton

4%

5,889

134

2.28%

$101

Johnson

De Soto

3%

7,263

464

6.39%

$283

Johnson

Olathe

7%

29,177

2,274

7.79%

$346

9%

26,970

1,810

6.71%

$298

11%

3,956

-

0.00%

$0

17%

2,314

116

5.00%

$222

Johnson

Wyandotte
Wyandotte

Shawnee
Mission
Pub Sch
TurnerKansas
City
PiperKansas
City

Wyandotte

Bonner
Springs

11%

2,608

-

0.00%

$0

Wyandotte

Kansas
City

27%

21,422

-

0.00%

$0

KSDE 2020 General Fund and Legal Max & NCES Common Core Public
School Universe Survey

4. Increased Costs of Achieving Common Outcome Goals for
Children in the Presence of Racial Isolation
Finally, we have explained in prior work that the costs of
achieving common outcome goals is influenced by racial isolation.
Costs of achieving common outcome goals are influenced by a
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variety of well understood factors including: child poverty
concentrations, shares of children for whom English is a second
language, shares of children with disabilities, regional differences
in wages needed to recruit and retain teachers of comparable
qualifications and other factors like district size and geographic
location.338 These factors are commonly accounted for in state
school finance systems, toward the goal of providing more equal
educational opportunity for children to achieve common outcomes.
We explored in a series of articles whether racial
composition—specifically Black racial isolation—has independent
effects on these costs that cannot be captured by race-neutral
alternatives.339 Table 5 shows select findings from a 2011 article
on this topic, using data from the state of Missouri from 2006–
2008. Table 4 focuses specifically on racially isolated inner urban
fringe districts around Saint Louis and Kansas City. If we estimate
costs of achieving equal opportunity using only the usual cost
factors, for example, Wellston (a district since dissolved) which was
100 percent Black at the time, would have a cost index of 1.099.340
That is, if the state average per pupil cost is assigned a 1.0,
Wellston’s costs are estimated to be about ten percent higher than
state average. But, if we consider our race-neutral alternative
measure which interacts child poverty with population density (a
feature of racially isolated Black districts), we find that Wellston’s
costs of equal opportunity rise to 43.6% above state average.341
That is, if the state of Missouri intends to give children across
districts equal opportunity to succeed on the measured outcome
metrics, the state would need to provide Wellston 43.6% more than
average funding.342 But, if we consider race directly in the
equation, that margin increases to sixty-four percent above state

338. BRUCE D. BAKER, EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY AND SCHOOL FINANCE: WHY
MONEY MATTERS FOR AMERICA’S STUDENTS (2018).
339. Baker, supra note 308; Preston C. Green, Bruce D. Baker, & Joseph
Oluwole, Race-conscious Funding Strategies and School Finance Litigation, 16
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39, 61 (2006); Baker & Green, supra note 309.
340. See infra Table 5. Select Missouri School District Cost Estimates from
Baker, 2011 (based on modeled data from 2006–2008) (displaying a 1.099 cost
index).
341. Id.
342. Id.
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average cost.343 We argued then and reiterate now that states must
be obligated to address these cost differences through their aid
formulas. These corrections are past due and race neutral
alternatives are insufficient.
Government endorsed and enabled policies of housing
segregation, led to intergenerational economic deprivation of Black
families in these metropolitan areas. As a result, we are now faced
with the increased costs of mitigating outcome disparities in the
presence of racial isolation.344 Federal courts shrugged off outcome
equity as a reasonable metric for evaluating desegregation
remedies in the 1990s, specifically regarding Kansas City.345 Here,
as in our previous work, we provide the basis for allocating
race-based differential funding to enable greater outcome
equity.346 Without taking this final step, the reparations
framework laid out herein would be incomplete.
Table 5. Select Missouri School District Cost Estimates from
Baker, 2011 (based on modeled data from 2006–2008)347

Metro
Area
Saint
Louis

Kansas
City

District

Wellston*
Normandy
Jennings
Riverview Gardens
Ferguson-Florissant
Hickman Mills
Grandview
Center

%
Black
100
98.8
98.7
96.7
77.2
79.2
58.8
64.7

Cost Index
without
Race or
Race
Neutral
Alternative
1.099
1.016
1.054
1.018
1.003
.996
.977
.998

Cost Index
with
Poverty ×
Density
1.436
1.307
1.525
1.293
1.099
1.036
.961
.979

Cost
Index
with
Race (%
Black)
1.640
1.460
1.501
1.453
1.312
1.318
1.177
1.231

343. Id.
344. FOSTER, supra note 292.
345. See generally Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
346. Green, Baker & Oluwole, supra note 339.
347. See Bruce D. Baker, Exploring the Sensitivity of Education Costs to
Racial Composition of Schools and Race-Neutral Alternative Measures, 86
PEABODY J. EDUC. 58, 73 (2011) (displaying a table showing the adverse effect of
poverty on achievement); Data source: From Table 7, page 48.
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*The Wellston district was merged with Normandy in 2010.

C. Equal Protection Clause Challenges
Plaintiffs from other racial and ethnic minority groups may
challenge our proposed reparations plan on equal protection
grounds because they were also harmed by the state government’s
racially discriminatory policies.348 Carlton Waterhouse reasons
that courts will reject these claims as long as states provide
particularized findings of their acts of racial discrimination
specifically against Blacks.349 “Rather than random or particular
instances,” he continues, “findings should go to systematic
exclusions or discrimination practices carried out, authorized, or
sanctioned by . . . state governments.”350
White plaintiffs may also challenge our proposed plan on equal
protection grounds.351 Such challenges pose a greater threat than
the ones brought by other racial minority and ethnic groups
because they go “to legislative authority to institute a reparations
program rather than legislative discretion to choose which victims
of past governmental discrimination will be its beneficiaries.”352
Because our reparations plan employs a racial classification, these
components would be subject to strict scrutiny.353 As such, they
would have to be narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling
governmental interest.354
The Supreme Court has recognized that state governments
have a compelling interest in eliminating the effects of past

348. See Carlton Waterhouse, Follow the Yellow Brick Road: Perusing the
Path to Constitutionally Permissible Reparations for Slavery and Jim Crow Era
Governmental Discrimination, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 163, 170 (2009) (showing how
equal protection is a grounds to challenge government policy).
349. See id. at 171 (dispensing claims so long as particular consideration is
given to Blacks).
350. Id.
351. See id. (allowing for white plaintiffs to challenge under the reparations
plan).
352. Id.
353. See id. at 172 (explaining the different levels of scrutiny appellate courts
employ).
354. Id.
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discrimination.355 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson356 provides
guidance for how state programs can satisfy this interest.357 In this
case, the Supreme Court invalidated Richmond, Virginia’s
set-aside program which required prime contractors to award
thirty percent of the dollar amount of each contract to one or more
minority business enterprises (MBEs).358 Minority groups
consisted of “Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts.”359 The Court rejected the claim that the
set-aside program was designed to eliminate the present effects of
past discrimination because:
There is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons
in any aspect of the Richmond construction industry. . . . It may
well be that Richmond has never had an Aleut or Eskimo
citizen. The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a
practical matter, may never have suffered from discrimination
in the construction industry in Richmond suggests that perhaps
the city’s purpose was not in fact to remedy past
discrimination.360

Thus, Croson shows that states must provide particularized
findings showing how its actions have led to the Black-white school
funding disparities laid out in our reparations plan.
With respect to the narrow tailoring prong, courts will
examine a variety of factors including, “the efficacy of alternative
remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief . . . ; and the
impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.”361 Three
components pose little problem for narrow analysis:
355. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (allowing states to
remedy past discrimination); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (same); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson. Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (same).
356. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (holding that
Richmond violated the Equal Protection Clause).
357. See generally id.
358. See id. at 469 (requiring contractors to award thirty percent of the
contracts to minorities).
359. Id. at 487.
360. Id. at 506.
361. See U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (finding that the order of
a one-for-one promotion of corporals was narrowly tailored to serve the states
compelling purposes).
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(a) Compensation to school districts for lost property revenues;
(b) tax rebates to Black taxpayers; and (c) increased funding to
racially isolated school districts.362 Under the narrow-tailoring
prong, there are no better ways to remedy these issues.363 In fact,
ostensibly race-neutral policies caused these problems in the first
place.364 Furthermore, these remedies do not impact the rights of
residents and taxpayers living in other school districts.365 These
remedies merely place Black taxpayers and predominantly Black
school districts on equal footing with their white counterparts.
Conversely, the component calling for redistribution of aid
distribution policies built on systemic racism might pose a
narrow-tailoring problem.366 Residents from predominantly white
school districts could assert that the loss of funding would have a
negative impact on them.367 A state could counter this assertion
with education cost studies showing that this redistribution of
funds would not affect these districts’ ability to provide their
students an adequate education as required by their state
education clauses.368
362. Cf. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 507-08 (presenting two reasons why the
plan in this case was not narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination: there
was no consideration of the use of race-neutral means and the goal was not
narrowly tailored to remedy the prior discrimination).
363. See id. at 507 (stating that the City in this case had not considered any
alternative to their proposed plan which means it did not pass the
narrow-tailoring analysis).
364. See id. at 505 (noting that nothing was presented that “clearly identified
and unquestionably” legitimized the scope of injury to minority contractors in this
case which called for necessary remedy).
365. See id. at 494 (explaining that classifications based on race must be
strictly reserved for remedial settings).
366. See Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green III, Harrowing Through
Narrow Tailoring: Voluntary Race-Conscious Student-Assignment Plans, Parents
Involved and Fisher, 14 WYO. L. REV. 705, 710 (2014) (highlighting how
narrow-tailoring analysis requires “evidence that the legislature observed and
intended to remedy lingering discriminatory impacts within the particular
institution affected by the remedial measure”).
367. See id. at 715 (explaining how diversity passing constitutional muster is
not “simple ethnic diversity,” such as racial set asides or quotas).
368. See Hugh Baran, In Croson’s Wake: Affirmative Action, Local Hiring, and
Struggle to Diversify America’s Building & Construction Trades, 39 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 299, 341 (2018) (noting how courts have consistently rejected
programs without any statistical studies); see also Baker & Green, supra note 309
(discussing of the use of cost studies).
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VII. Part VI: Federal Role

The federal government must also play a role in any
reparations program that addresses Black-white school funding
disparities. We take this stance in part because of the federal
government’s role in creating these enduring gaps, which we
explained earlier in this Article.369 It is also worth noting that
Congress has provided reparations to other racial groups to atone
for wrongdoing.370 For instance, Congress authorized reparation
payments to Native American tribes in 1946 for land taken from
them.371 Then, in 1971, through the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, Congress created a trust fund that distributed
resource extraction profits.372 Additionally, Congress allocated
$462.5 million from the general treasury fund for Native
Americans.373 In 1948, Congress passed the American Japanese
Evacuation Claims Act designed to partially pay Japanese
Americans for loss of property during internment.374 A mere total
of $100,000 was allocated and claimants had to prove loss of
369. See infra Parts I and II.
370. See Adeel Hassan & Jack Healy, America has Tried Reparations Before.
Here
is
How
it
Went.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
19,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/us/reparations-slavery.html
(explaining
Acts where the United States paid reparations to Native Americans and
Japanese-American survivors of internment) [perma.cc/U6Q2-EPJY].
371. See Michael Conklin, An Uphill Battle for Reparationists: A Quantitative
Analysis of the Effectiveness of Slavery Reparations Rhetoric, 10 COLUM. J. RACE
& L. 33, 39 (2020) (noting that in the past 100 years the payment of reparations
has diversified from the past when payments were largely limited to instances of
the losing state in a war agreeing to make payments to the victor and now it is a
form of remedy for mistreatment).
372. See Ryan Fortson, Models of Reparations for Slavery: Correcting the
Harms of Slavery: Collective Liability, The Limited Prospects of Success for a
Class Action Suit for Slavery Reparations, and the Reconceptualization of White
Racial Identity, 6 AFR. AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 71, 107 (2004) (highlighting that there
are many times in history that Congress has provided some sort of restitution to
Native Americans).
373. See id. at 107 (explaining that this was specifically meant to be
distributed amongst Native Alaskan tribes).
374. Westley, supra note 266, at 450–51 (listing indignities and losses
suffered by the Japanese Americans due to internment); For a great discussion of
the Japanese-American reparations, see generally Dale Minami, Lessons from
Other Reparations Movements: Japanese-American Redress, 6 AFR. AM. L. &
POL’Y REP 27 (2004); Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the
Seventh Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 83–84 (2008).
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property and that the loss happened as a natural result of the
evacuation for internment.375 Additionally, it required claimants to
give up their rights to any future evacuation-related claims against
the federal government.376 In 1988, Congress, in partnership with
President Reagan, passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 which
appropriated $20,000 per person reparation payments to
Japanese-Americans for internment during World War II.377 Ryan
Fortson points out that “the reparations awarded to those interned
was not the result of a lawsuit but rather occurred by Congress
directly appropriating funds for that purpose.”378 As Robert
Westley notes, “the importance of the legislation lies in the
precedent established for compensation of wronged groups within
the American system.”379 However, Dale Minami notes that the
Civil Liberties Act of 1988 “limited redress to those Americans of
Japanese ancestry who were alive on the date of the signing, a
requirement inserted for a reason—to avoid a ‘precedent’ for
African
Americans.”380
Blacks
advocated
for
the

375. Westley, supra note 266, at 450 (noting that this piece of legislation is
the “only official attempt by Congress to compensate Japanese American property
losses for over forty years”).
376. Id. at 450–51 (highlighting another flaw in the legislation was that
compensation was only provided once loss of property could be proved by records).
377. Fortson, supra note 372, at 92 (noting that the reparations were paid to
roughly 60,000 survivors). The reparations payments amounted to anywhere
between $1.2 billion and $1.6 billion. Id. at 92; Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual
and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497,
499–500 (2003). For more on the Japanese-American reparations and the Civil
Liberties Act of 1988, see Chad W. Bryan, Precedent for Reparations? A Look at
Historical Movement for Redress and Where Awarding Reparations for Slavery
Might Fit, 54 ALA. L. REV. 599, 601–03 (2003); Mishael A. Danielson & Alexis
Pimentel, Give Them Their Due: An African-American Reparations Program
Based on the Native American Federal Aid Model, 10 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC
ANC. L. J. 89, 103–05 (2004).
378. Fortson, supra note 372, at 108; see Abigail M. Holden, Sandra Hye Yun
Kim, & Erik K. Yamamoto, American Reparations Theory and Practice at the
Crossroads, 44 CAL. W.L. REV. 1, 75–76 (2007) (showcasing an example of
reparations was the Public Health Services payments to 399 Black men who were
experimented on like laboratory rats in study of late-stage syphilis. These men
were allowed to die a slow death rather than getting penicillin to treat the disease.
Twenty-eight of the men died from syphilis and 100 from complications).
379. Westley, supra note 266, at 451.
380. Dale Minami, Lessons from Other Reparations Movements:
Japanese-American Redress, 6 AFR. AM. L. & POL’Y REP 27, 33 (2004).
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Japanese-American reparations.381 In fact, “we saw solidarity
among members of Congress.382 The Japanese-American
contingent, and all of the Latino and Black caucuses supported
Japanese-American redress, giving the issue weight and moral
authority.”383
In contrast, Congress has taken limited actions to address the
harm that slavery, Jim Crow, and other forms of discrimination
has inflicted upon the Black community.384 In 1865, during the
Civil War, General Sherman’s Field Order No. 15 called for
redistribution of forty acres of land and a mule to each freedman.385
381. See id. at 33 (highlighting how “other Asian Americans, Jewish
Americans, other people of color, and white Americans all came together and
lobbied on behalf of Japanese Americans”).
382. Id. at 34.
383. See id. at 33 (“Other Asian Americans, Jewish Americans, African
Americans, other people of color, and white Americans all came together and
lobbied on behalf of Japanese Americans.”). Japanese-American civil rights
attorney Dale Minami calls for unity with African-American reparations efforts:
Many in our community never thought this Redress Bill would ever
pass. Many of us were skeptical, but thought we should take this
journey anyway because the journey was as important as the
destination. We needed to attempt to make America live up to its own
rhetoric of equal liberty, equal rights, and stand the test of truth and
time. We felt that it was important, whether we won redress or not, to
take the journey. Whether we won redress or not, we believed our
efforts would educate the American public. And for that victory alone,
it is incumbent on all of us to continue these efforts to educate—for all
of us to take this journey for African-American redress. Id. at 34.
384. See Holden, supra note 378, at 85 (explaining that the Senate, as well as
Virginia, did put forth an apology for inaction in the face of widespread Jim Crow
lynching).
385. See Adjoa Aiyetoro, Achieving Reparations While Respecting Our
Differences: A Model for Black Reparations, 63 HOW. L.J. 329, 336 (2020) (noting
how this land was not a gift, and that the receivers had to pay rent for the first
three years, then required payment of the value of the land to purchase); Emma
Coleman Jordan, The Importance of Slavery Reparations: The Non-Monetary
Value of Reparations Rhetoric, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 21, 24 (2004) (“The
forty acres and a mule that General Sherman promised to the slaves was the
beginning of the idea of reparations in America, but not the end.”); Danielson &
Pimentel, supra note 377, at 103 (noting that, as with all the reprehensible
injustices against slaves, the mules for this reparation were “animals too weak
for military service”); David C. Gray, A No-Excuse Approach to Transitional
Justice: Reparations as Tools of Extraordinary Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1043,
1049 (2010) (explaining how in the end, the promise ended up being a mere
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Congress then worked with President Abraham Lincoln to enact
the Freedmen’s Bureau Act.386 The Freedmen’s Bureau Act
established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned
Lands (Freedmen’s Bureau) to rent out the forty acres to freedmen
for three years with a possibility of purchase.387 Sadly, the
distribution was not equitable but rather based on whom the
federal government considered loyal and deserving.388 Moreover,
the Bureau’s funding was cut and the lands reverted to
slaveowners
as
President
Andrew
Johnson
pardoned
389
ex-Confederates and returned land to them.
The Freedmen’s
Bureau Act had a relatively nominal impact on education
compared to the need:
Under the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866, Congress provided
nominal empty promise as the reparations were not justly paid); Patricia M.
Muhammad, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Legacy Establishing a Case for
International Reparations, 3 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 147, 199 (2013) (highlighting
how the empty promises impacted more than the generation which they were
denied to because it also “deprived historic victims of lawful property” who should
have inherited such estates).
386. See Aiyetoro, supra note 385, at 336 (explaining that the first bill was
vetoed by President Johnson, but after modifying the bill, it passed in 1866);
Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining the
Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677,
685–86 (1999) (stating that the final bill authorized Congress’s appropriation of
funds to purchase school buildings for refugees and freedmen, and to empower
the President to “reserve up to three million acres of “good” public land . . . .”).
387. See Aiyetoro, supra note 385, at 336 (noting that the land was not a gift,
and that the government charged rent for the land for the first three years with
the option to purchase).
388. See Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door:
Examining the Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 677, 686 (1999) (indicating that the act was only authorized for two
years).
389. See Westley, supra note 266, at 460 (highlighting that the freedmen and
refugee’s hope of buying this land from the federal government also evaporated
with this action); Zachary F. Bookman, A Role for Courts in Reparations, 20 NAT’L
BLACK L.J. 75, 101 n.148 (2007) (explaining that President Johnson revoked
General Sherman’s order to distribute 40 acres to free black families); Maxine
Burkett, Reconciliation and Nonrepetition:
A New Paradigm for
African-American Reparations, 86 OR. L. REV. 99, 107–08 (2007) (noting how
Sherman’s order was in alignment with President Lincoln's belief that
emancipated slaves needed land as an economic base for their advancement);
Danielson & Pimentel, supra note 377, at 100 (expounding on the fact that
General Sherman had the support of the War Department when he made the
original land grants).
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$ 500,000 for rent and repair of school and asylum buildings,
and decided that the Bureau might “seize, hold, lease or sell for
school purposes” any property of the ex-Confederate States. To
meet the need for permanent schools, the Bureau in most states
paid for completion of buildings that the freedmen themselves
began constructing. Often these structures were located on land
that the freedmen had purchased for themselves. Additionally,
in order to obtain financial assistance from the Bureau, school
organizations were required to ensure that the buildings would
always be used for educational purposes and that no pupil
would ever be excluded because of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude. By March, 1869, the Bureau had either
built or had helped to build 630 schoolhouses. It had spent
$1,771,132.25. In the next three years, its appropriation for
educational expenses amounted to another $2,000,000.390

Then in 1867, Representative Thaddeus Stevens introduced the
Reparations Bill in Congress, but it failed to pass.391 This bill
stated:
And be it further enacted. That out of the lands thus seized and
confiscated the slaves who have been liberated by the
operations of the war and the amendment to the constitution or
otherwise, who resided in said “confederate States” on the 4th
day of March, A.D. 1861, or since, shall have distributed to them
as follows, namely: [T]o each male person who is the head of a
family, forty acres; to each adult male, whether the head of a
family or not, forty acres, to each widow who is the head of a
family, forty acres—to be held by them in fee-simple, but to be
inalienable for the next ten years after they become seized
thereof.392

390. Westley, supra note 266, at 461; see Williams, supra note 274, at 445–46
(“After the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, doors to educational
opportunities slowly opened for Blacks throughout the South. The Freedmen’s
Bureau, which Congress established in 1866 to help the newly freed slaves,
provided the first public schooling for Blacks, as well as for Whites in the South.”).
391. See Muhammad, supra note 385, at 155 (noting that even though this
effort failed, it is considered one of the earliest landmark legal decisions to initiate
the grant of reparations for past slavery); see also Jeremy Levitt, Black African
Reparations: Making a Claim for Enslavement and Systematic De Jure
Segregation and Racial Discrimination Under American and International Law,
25 S.U. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1997) (expanding on Stevens’ search for fundamental
change aimed at dismantling the “Southern plantation system and redistributing
land to formerly enslaved Blacks”).
392. Muhammad, supra note 385, at 155.
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Congress subsequently rejected calls to enact pension
legislation for freedmen.393 Adjoa Aiyetoro, co-chair of the
Reparations Coordinating Committee of the National Coalition of
Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA), observes that
Congress’s
failure
to
pass
the
“Ex-Slave
Pension
legislation . . . supports the conclusion that Congress maintained
its disdain for and insensitivity to formerly enslaved African
descendants by denying it owed them a debt due to its support of
enslavement.”394 Additionally, as Alfred Brophy points out, “as the
United States struggled with extricating itself from the tragedy of
slavery in the years of the Civil War and Reconstruction, some
members of Congress proposed transferring land to former
slaves.395 The proposals, if followed, would have resulted in huge
redistribution of property.”396
Congressman John Conyers introduced H.R. 40 for
African-American reparations in 1989 but it has not made it to the
House floor.397 The bill calls for creation of a commission that
393. See Aiyetoro, supra note 385, at 337 (listing three reasons redress failed
as the (1) whites in power’s reluctance to acknowledge a debt, (2) whites’ refusal
to share leadership, and (3) class and perspective divisions within the black
community).
394. See id. at 338 (noting how many previously enslaved individuals failed
to benefit from pension plans meant for those who served in the Civil War because
they couldn’t provide documentation of their service).
395. See Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in
Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 498 (2003) (explaining
the plans were forward thinking and focused on economic independence and
virtue).
396. See id. (“it is doubtful that anyone would be talking about reparations
now, for there would be no need for them. African Americans would have
educational opportunities and wealth equivalent to (or approaching) that of the
white population.”).
397. See Aiyetoro, supra note 385, at 343 (explaining that this bill was filed
every year that Congressman John Conyers was in office); Zachary F. Bookman,
A Role for Courts In Reparations, 20 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 75, 84 n.54 (2007) (noting
how shrewd it was for the bill to be named H.R. 40 after the failed attempt by
General Sherman to provide freed slaves with 40 acres of land.); Commission to
Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 116th Cong.
(2019) (highlighting the three goals of the commission to identify “(1) the role of
the federal and state governments in supporting the institution of slavery, (2)
forms of discrimination in the public and private sectors against freed slaves and
their descendants, and (3) lingering negative effects of slavery on living
African-Americans and society”); Danielson & Pimentel, supra note 377, at 105–
06 (stating the purpose of the Conyers Bill presented to the Judiciary Committee
in 2001); Maxine Burkett, Reconciliation and Nonrepetition: A New Paradigm for
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would study the impact of slavery and ongoing discrimination; and
make recommendations on reparations through apology and
monetary payments.398 It also calls for educating the public about
the damage of slavery.399 In 2000, Congressman Tony Hall
unsuccessfully introduced his bill in 2000—a bill designed to
acknowledge the federal government’s contributions to slavery as
well as issue a formal apology for these contributions.400
Congressman Conyers persisted by reintroducing his bill every
year thereafter until he left Congress at which point
Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee took up the mantle starting
in 2019 with 125 co-sponsors and a Senate version S.1083
spearheaded by Senator Cory Booker.401 Under the leadership of
African-American Reparations, 86 OR. L. REV. 99, 127–29 (2007) (noting his status
as a twenty-five-year veteran of Capitol Hill at the time he first introduced the
bill).
398. See Fortson, supra note 372, at 115 (highlighting a reason that Congress
has not moved on Congressman Conyers’ repeated attempts to pass this bill
because the government is only exposed to liability once it has given consent); see
also Brophy, supra note 395, at 499 (proposing ways to educate Americans about
the history of slavery on top of making recommendations for reparations).
399. See Fortson, supra note 372, at 115 (mentioning other goals of the bill
such as a formal apology, but at the same time stating these goals as the reason
the bill won’t go very far).
400. See id. (noting the closest the bill comes to reparations was a call for “an
attempt at real restitution); Yomamata et al., supra note 378, at 72–73 ( “[T]he
United States dramatically pulled out of the widely publicized 2001 United
Nations Conference on Contemporary Racism in Durban, South Africa, in fear of
a resolution naming slavery a crime against humanity.”); Danielson & Pimentel,
supra note 377, at 109 (stating that the United States government has to approve
reparations in order to claim credible moral authority internationally).
Just as America implores the world community to recognize human
rights abuses by ostracizing, punishing and even invading sovereign
states that refuse to meet America’s standards regarding human
rights, America should consider its own history on these issues and
assume the ‘highest responsibility’ in ensuring that those who were
denied these same rights are justly compensated. Otherwise, just as
some authors theorize, America may appear as a hypocrite in the
international community.
For a discussion of the United States’ claims to international moral authority in
advocacy for reparations, see Joe R. Feagin, Documenting the Costs of Slavery,
Segregation, and Contemporary Racism: Why Reparations Are in Order for
African Americans, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 49, 64–65 (2004).
401. See Aiyetoro, supra note 385, at 348 (highlighting how we should stop
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Chairman Jerrod Nadler, the Judiciary Committee in the House of
Representatives held a hearing on reparations for slavery on June
19, 2019.402 The hearing included compelling discussions of slavery
and its lingering impact on African Americans.403 “To date, more
than ten cities, including Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Dallas, and
Washington, D.C., have passed resolutions calling on the federal
government to inquire into the effects of slavery.”404 Additionally
eighty percent of the 2020 Democratic presidential frontrunners
expressed support for reparations signaling the possibility of
federal action on reparations.405 We agree with Vincent Verdun
believing the process needs to be controlled by the fear of proposal rejections as it
will only halt the efforts to obtain reparations); see also Valorie E. Douglas,
Reparations 4.0: Trading in Older Models for a New Vehicle, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 839,
874 (2020) (noting that Congressman Conyers Jr. introduced the bill for 25 years);
see Fortson, supra note 372, at 115 (adding that ten cities have already called on
the federal government to inquire into the effects of slavery); see Fortson, supra
note 372, at 116 (“On the other hand, Representative Conyers wrote legislation
calling for a national holiday honoring Martin Luther King, Jr. only four days
after Dr. King was assassinated and the holiday was not established for more
than fifteen years, so perhaps with persistence Conyers’ reparations efforts will
also succeed.”).
402. H.R. 40 and the Path to Restorative Justice Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary,
116th
Cong.
(2019),
https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2261
[perma.cc/SB5V-6GEV].
403. See id. (including one story told by Katrina Browne which is now a
documentary titled Traces of the Trade: A Story from the Deep North and follows
a family retracing the steps of their ancestors’ triangle trade).
404. See Fortson, supra note 372, at 115 (noting that if states were ensured
they would not be presented with legal liability after an apology, more states may
take similar action).
405. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Redressing Foundational Wrongs, 51 U. TOL. L.
REV. 13, 33 (2004).
In reparations discussions, America must remember that African
Americans “are not ‘victims’ begging for relief from the injustices
inflicted upon them, but human beings who, individually and in
community, are insisting that their rights be respected and that the
perpetrator state comply with the rule of law. They must have the final
say in what constitutes meaningful and appropriate redress. If this
process works as it should, they will be empowered by it.
See also Conklin, supra note 371, at 41 (comparing this statistic to the 2016
Democratic Primary where all three candidates on the ballot expressly rejected
reparations).
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that “[g]ranting reparations to Japanese Americans [and other
groups] without granting similar compensation to African
Americans sends the latter yet another message declaring that
they are on the bottom of society’s ladder, and this exclusion
confirms their sense of futility in the quest for justice in the United
States.406 Amelioration of one ill has made a previously tolerable
condition seem degrading.”407 While a broad reparations plan for
Black Americans is beyond the scope of this article, we outline
below new legislation and regulatory actions that the federal
government can take to bring about reparations approaches to
school finance reform.
A. Legislation to Remediate Black-White School Funding Gaps
Congress could provide states with funding to eradicate
Black-white school funding disparities pursuant to the Spending
Clause, which provides, “The Congress shall have the Power to lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the Common defense and General Welfare of the
United States.”408 Congress has enacted several statutes impacting
406. Vincent Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to
African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597, 659 (1993) (explaining that the latter
message referred to is that “African Americans cannot distinguish their suffering
from that of Japanese Americans, except to conclude that the injuries suffered by
African Americans were more severe.”).
407. Id. at 659.
The indubitable truth is “[n]o nation can enslave a race of people for
hundreds of years, set them free bedraggled and penniless, put them,
without assistance in a hostile environment, against privileged
victimizers, and then reasonably expect the gap between the heirs of
the two groups to narrow. Lines, begun parallel and left alone, can
never touch.”
See President Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, Speech at Howard
University Commencement (June 4, 1965), reprinted in Lee Rainwater & William
L. Yancey, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 125 (1967)
(affirming this point through his explanations of racial prejudice); see also Charles
J. Ogletree, Jr., The Significance of Brown, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 1, 10–12
(2004) (explaining the resistance to integrate schools after Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
408. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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education through this constitutional provision including the No
Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) and the Every Student Succeeds
Act (ESSA).409 In South Dakota v. Dole,410 the Supreme Court laid
out a four-part test for determining the limits of the federal
government’s spending power: (1) The program was in pursuit of
the general welfare; (2) any condition for accepting the funds is
unambiguously stated so that states can knowingly choose
whether to accept the funding; (3) there is a relation between the
federal interest and the purpose of the federal funding; and (4) the
spending condition does not violate another constitutional
provision.411
In addition to the four-part test, the Court recognized that
Congress might unconstitutionally coerce states into accepting
federal funding.412 In Dole, the Court ruled that the Minimum
Drinking Age Act, which withheld five percent of state funding if
states failed to raise the drinking age to twenty-one was not
coercive because states would lose only a small percentage of
federal funding.413 However, in National Federation of
Independent Business v Sebelius, (NFIB)414 the Court found that
the expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act
constituted illegal coercion.415 Instead of providing states with
“relatively mild encouragement,” as was the case in Dole, the Court

409. See Anna Williams Shavers, Using International Human Rights Law in
School Finance to Establish Education as a Fundamental Right, 27 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 457, 473 (2018) (discussing how Congress uses the General Welfare
Clause to influence educational policy).
410. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (holding that a federal
statute that withheld federal funds from states whose legal drinking age did not
conform to federal policy).
411. See id. at 207–08 (finding that the fourth limitation occurs when
Congress is inducing the states to engage “in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional”).
412. See id. at 211 (stating that the point which would be too far is when
“pressure turns into compulsion”).
413. See id. (noting that states would only lose 5% of funds otherwise
obtainable under specified highway grant programs).
414. See Nat’l Fed. Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (holding
that the Medicaid expansion portion of the Affordable Care Act violates the
Constitution).
415. See id. at 585 (stating Congress is attempting to “conscript state
[agencies] into the national bureaucratic army”).
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likened the choice presented to states in NFIB to “a gun to the
head.”416
A federal spending program for states to close Black-white
school funding gaps caused by state and federal housing policies
would satisfy the first prong of the Dole test.417 Clearly, such a
program would be in the interest of the general welfare. Congress
could satisfy the second prong of the Dole test by clearly indicating
to states that they must use this funding to eliminate funding
disparities between Black and white school districts.418 With
respect to the third prong, Congress could provide findings
showing how state policies have helped to create the conditions
leading to Black-white school funding disparities.
With respect to the final prong, this statute would probably be
subject to an equal protection challenge.419 As the Supreme Court
made clear in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña,420 federal
spending programs that offer financial incentives are subject to
strict scrutiny if they employ racial classifications.421 To satisfy the
compelling interest of eliminating past discrimination, Congress
would have to provide particularized findings of state practices
that have created Black-white school funding disparities.422 This
statute could withstand narrow-tailoring analysis because:
(1) There are no better ways to correct Black-white school funding
disparities than to provide additional funding to predominantly
Black school districts; and (2) predominantly white school districts
416. See id. at 582 (noting that states would lose 10% of their overall budget
if they do not comply, leaving them with no real option but to acquiesce).
417. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (highlighting that in
considering whether the expenditure is intended to “serve general public
purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress”).
418. See id. (meaning Congress must ensure that states exercise their choice
“knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation”).
419. See id. at 207-08 (explaining that conditions on “federal grants might be
illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national
projects or programs.”).
420. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding
that all racial classifications must be analyzed under strict scrutiny).
421. See id. at 237 (restating that race-based action may be necessary to
further a compelling interest, but it must satisfy the compelling interest test and
the “narrow-tailoring” test).
422. See id. at 230 (enacting “racial classifications only when doing so is
necessary to further a ‘compelling interest’ does not contravene any principle of
appropriate respect for a coequal branch of the Government”).
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do not suffer any harm by placing their Black counterparts on an
equal footing.423 To avoid challenges of coercion, Congress can
make sure that the program is not so large as to constitute an offer
that states cannot refuse.424 Also, this proposed program would not
be connected with any other spending program, so it does not pose
the danger to which the Court objected in the NFIB case.425
B. Legislation Providing Additional Funding for School Districts
Experiencing Black Racial Isolation
Similarly, we propose that Congress enact legislation
providing states with additional funding for school districts
experiencing Black racial isolation.426 Funding pursuant to this
spending program would be used to mitigate disparities in
educational outcomes.427 This spending program could also satisfy
the Dole test.428 It would satisfy the first prong because it would
combat the outcome inequities experienced by these districts
caused by state and federal government endorsed and enabled
housing segregation.429 Congress could satisfy the second prong by
423. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (listing factors
which are to be considered in determining whether race-conscious remedies are
appropriate such as necessity, alternative remedies, the flexibility and duration
of the relief, and the impact of the relief on third parties).
424. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (stating that the
point which would be too far is when “pressure turns into compulsion.”).
425. See Nat’l Fed. Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 558 (2012) (noting
that the “individual mandate forces individuals into commerce precisely because
they elected to refrain from commercial activity”).
426. See Lauren Camera, Segregation Reinforced by School Districts, U.S.
NEWS (July 25, 2019, 4:19 P.M.), https://www.usnews.com/news/educationnews/articles/2019-07-25/racial-and-economic-segregation-reinforced-by-schooldistrict-boundaries (explaining that of the 13 school districts surrounding
Philadelphia, two-thirds are at least 25% more white and have at “least 10% more
funding for their schools than the city schools—equating to an average of $5,000
or more in per-pupil funding”) [perma.cc/Y7E4-FK7B].
427. See Baker & Green, supra note 309 at 316 (finding that “just as racial
achievement gaps persist in education, the cost of closing achievement gaps varies
across school districts – in part associated with the racial composition of those
school districts”).
428. See supra Part VI, A. Legislation to Remediate Black-White School
Funding Gaps.
429. Id.
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clearly laying out the conditions for state participation.430 Congress
could satisfy the third prong by providing particularized findings
showing how state and federal housing policies have helped to
create racially isolated Black school districts that need increased
funding to attain state and federally mandated educational
outcomes.431 This program could withstand an equal protection
challenge for the same reasons as the funding program to
eliminate Black-white school funding disparities.432 Finally,
Congress must be mindful to design the program so as to not
constitute coercion.
C. Department of Education Enforcement Action Pursuant to Title
VI’s Implementing Regulations
Finally, the U.S. Department of Education could work with
states to eliminate Black-white school funding disparities through
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.433 Title VI provides: “No
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”434 The Supreme
Court has held that this provision prohibits only intentional
discrimination.435 However, the Department of Education has
promulgated a regulatory provision that prohibits recipients of
federal funding from engaging in policies that have a disparate
impact on protected groups:
A recipient [of federal funds] . . . may not, directly or through
contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods
of administration which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or
national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially
impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. See supra Part VI.A. Legislation to Remediate Black-White School
Funding Gaps.
434. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018).
435. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) (“Title VI itself
directly reach[es] only instances of intentional discrimination.”).
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respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national
origin.436

Title VI has authorized the DOE to initiate an investigation of
a recipient of federal funding “whenever a compliance review,
report, complaint, or any other information indicates a possible
failure to comply with this part.”437 If the investigation reveals a
failure to comply, the regulation provides that “the matter will be
resolved by informal means whenever possible.”438 If the
noncompliance cannot be resolved by informal means, the
regulations authorize the DOE to obtain compliance by suspending
or terminating federal funding or “by any other means authorized
by law.”439 Such other means include referring the matter to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for enforcement.440
Thus far, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the enforcement
wing of the Department, has not used the power granted under the
Title VI regulations to address state racial funding disparities.441
However, in two Dear Colleague letters, OCR did recognize this
problem.442 The first letter, issued in 2001, noted that school
districts with high concentrations of minority students: (1) “[W]ere
less likely to have experienced certified teachers who are teaching
in their area of expertise”; (2) “were significantly more likely . . . to
have less adequate environmental conditions across several
measures, including lighting, heating, ventilation, air quality,
noise control, energy efficiency, and physical security”; (3) were
436. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2020).
437. 34 C.F.R. §§ 107(a), (c) (2020).
438. Id. § 107(d)(1).
439. 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a)(8).
440. See id. (“No action to effect compliance by any other means authorized
by law shall be taken until (1) the responsible Department official has determined
that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means, (2) the recipient or other
person has been notified of its failure to comply and of the action to be taken to
effect compliance, and (3) the expiration of at least 10 days from the mailing of
such notice to the recipient or other person.”).
441. See S. Hsin, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45665, CIVIL RIGHTS AT SCHOOL:
AGENCY ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 17 (2019)
(explaining how the Office of Civil Rights enforces Title VI regulations).
442. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, “Dear Colleague” Letter,
at 2 (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleagueresourcecomp-201410.pdf (recognizing the department’s Title VI power)
[perma.cc/NJB4-XRRR].
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“less likely to have access to . . . computers”; and (4) received less
funding per pupil than their low-minority counterparts.443 The
letter concluded by “strongly encourag[ing] all states to examine
their provision of educational resources.”444
The second letter, issued in 2014, addressed the problem of
unequal access to educational resources experienced by school
districts serving students of color.445 Specifically, the letter pointed
out that districts serving such students were at a disadvantage to
their predominantly white districts with respect to: (1) Advanced
courses and gifted and talented programs; (2) experienced
teachers; (3) facilities; and (4) access to instructional materials and
technology.446 The letter observed that districts needed adequate
funding to provide the resources to provide the resources listed
above, but districts serving students of color often lacked such
funding because of “funding systems that allocate less State and
local funds to high-poverty schools that frequently have more
students of color.”447 The letter asserted that school districts could
violate Title VI by adopting facially neutral funding policies that
had a racially disparate impact.448 OCR laid out a three-step
process for making this determination: (1) Whether the school
district had a facially neutral policy that created an adverse racial
impact; (2) whether the school district could demonstrate an
important educational goal for the policy; and (3) whether there
are alternative policies that could accomplish the district’s goal
with less discriminatory effect on an affected racial group.449
Although the letter focused on the resource allocations of school
districts, the OCR observed that states also had to “comply with
Title
VI’s
nondiscrimination
requirements,
including
nondiscrimination in their provision and allocation of education
resources.”450 Therefore, OCR:
[S]trongly encourages State education officials and school
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 3–5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 1 n.†.
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administrators to closely review this letter and to take proactive
steps to ensure that the educational resources they provide are
distributed in a manner that does not discriminate against
students on the basis of race, color, or national origin. In
particular, State education officials should examine policies and
practices for resource allocation among districts to ensure that
differences among districts do not have the unjustified effect of
discriminating on the basis of race.451

In turn, we strongly urge OCR to investigate racial funding
disparities at the state level, using the investigatory mechanism
laid out in the Dear Colleague Letter to help states redress the
policies that are creating Black-white school funding disparities.
VIII. Conclusion
This article has addressed why and how school finance reform
should be a part of a reparations program for Black Americans.
Black-white school funding disparities have endured from the
separate-but-equal era to the present day despite more than
sixty-five years of school desegregation and school finance
litigation. State and federal governmental housing policies, state
school funding formulas, and Supreme Court decisions have helped
to create these Black-white school funding gaps. Consequently,
many predominantly Black school districts are racially isolated,
thus needing more resources than predominantly white schools to
attain the same educational outcomes. Furthermore, Black
taxpayers suffer harm because they have to pay more taxes than
their white counterparts to fund education.
Because litigation has proven inadequate to achieve
reparations for school finance reform, we have set out a legislative
plan that state and federal governments could adopt. Our four-part
plan for state legislation calls for: (1) Compensation to school
districts caused by unequal taxation; (2) rebates to Black property
taxpayers covering Black-white differentials in residential
taxation; (3) redistribution of school finance and aid distributions
based on systemic racism; and (4) increased funding to Black
school districts that are experiencing racial isolation. Our plan for
federal action calls for legislation providing funding to remediate
451.

Id.
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Black-white school funding gaps and additional funding to school
districts experiencing Black racial isolation. In addition, the U.S.
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) should
work with states pursuant to Title VI’s implementing regulations
to remedy the effects of funding policies that have an adverse
disparate impact on predominantly Black school districts.

